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1 Introduction 
The end of the Cold War resulted in a series of major political whirlwind. The fall 
of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 were seen 
as final seals of victory for the Western liberal democracy. The loss of faith in 
systems with political power resting on socialist ideology was evident all around 
the world. In China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) struggled to hold on to 
its authoritarian position.  Tiananmen Square incident
1
 in the spring and summer 
of 1989 was an ultimate wake up call for the communist party leadership.
2
 The 
pure scope of the protests and their violent suppression left the country divided 
and made the party fully aware of its looming legitimacy crisis.  
How then, after 25 years, could the CCP still be holding on to power? The answer 
lies in the ability of the party to adapt to changes in the surrounding political 
environment.
3
 This remarkable resilience has saved the party from not losing its 
face even during the most difficult transition periods.  
If one thinks of modern Chinese history as progressing from one revolution to 
another, it is easy to determine at least three main periods of profound change. 
China’s first revolution refers to the founding of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) in 1949. Back then, justification for ruling mandate was mainly derived 
from socialist ideology. The second revolution began with the launching of reform 
and opening up policies in the late 1970’s and culminated in the dramatic events 
of Tiananmen only a decade later. To maintain its credibility, the party gradually 
backed down on ideological argumentation and focused on the legitimizing effect 
of economic development instead.
4
 Now at hand is a third period of intensive 
social change as the drawbacks of reform policies are becoming more and more 
                                                 
1
 The Tiananmen Square incident refers to a series of pro-democracy demonstrations that took 
place in Tiananmen Square, Beijing in the spring and summer of 1989. The demonstrations were 
suppressed with military force resulting in thousands of casualties and international condemnation 
of the People´s Republic of China. 
2
 Zhong, Yang (1996): Legitimacy Crisis and Legitimacy in China. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 
Vol. 26, Issue 2, 1. 
3
 Guo, Baogang (2003): Political Legitimacy and China’s Transition. Journal of Chinese Political 
Science, Vol. 8, No. 1&2, 2. 
4
 Leonard, Mark (2008): What does the new China think? In Leonard, Mark (ed.): China 3.0. 
European Council on Foreign Relations. November, 10, 61-63. 
<http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR66_CHINA_30_final.pdf>  Last retrieved 9.10.2014. 
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difficult to sweep under the rug.
 
In a 2012 survey conducted by the Global Times, 
an English-language tabloid under the Renmin Ribao Group, more than 15 per 
cent of the respondents placed China “at the edge of a new revolution”, while 34 
per cent believed that such a point had already been reached.
5
   
China’s reform period has often been dubbed as an economic miracle beyond 
compare. In fact, the country holds the record of the longest sustained economic 
growth in the whole of human history.
6
 The increase in household wealth and 
national income has indeed been substantial. However, behind the record high 
GDP growth rates there are a growing number of people feeling disadvantaged or 
estranged by the drastic changes in policy orientation.
7
 Rampant corruption, 
widening income gaps, social unrest and environmental problems are just a few 
examples of the negative side-effects that have followed from the accelerating 
marketization efforts. The term “guofu mingqiong” (rich country, poor people) 
well describes the current state of affairs, where members of the elite seem to have 
grasped a bigger slice of the pie than most ordinary Chinese citizens.
8
 Discontent 
has even taken the form of large-scale anti-government protestations, most 
notably in Tibet and Xinjiang. 
The CCP has thus far managed to maintain its authoritarian position, even though 
not much of its original legacy is left.  This so-called third revolution - a term 
used extensively by scholars and journalists when referring to China’s current 
problems and social instability - puts the party once more in the difficult position 
of re-legitimating itself in order to live through.  
The battle for survival has already generated a lively academic debate about the 
future of the one-party system and its remaining legitimacy sources. Many 
                                                 
5
 Cheng, Joseph Y.S (2013): The “Chongqing Model”: What it Means to China Today? Journal of 
Comparative Asian Development, Vol. 12, Issue 3, 414. 
6
 Mauldin, John (2014): Can Central Planners Revive China's Economic Miracle? Forbes, 
8.6.2014. 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2014/06/08/can-central-planners-revive-chinas-
economic-miracle/> Last retrieved 6.11.2014. 
7
 Saich, Tony (2011): Governance and Politics of China, 3rd Edition. Palgrave Macmillan, 
Hampshire & New York, 67. 
8
 Zhu, Yuchao (2011): “Performance Legitimacy” and China´s Political Adaptation Strategy. 
Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 16, Issue 2, June, 135. 
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prominent China scholars have approached the topic from their own perspectives, 
yet oftentimes underrating the enduring importance of ideology.
9
  
This is a regrettable shortcoming as Maoist thought has recently made an 
impressive comeback in Chinese politics. Under the reigns of Hu Jintao (2002-
2012) and Xi Jinping (2012- ), socialist doctrines have experienced a renaissance 
during which long lost elements of red rhetoric have again found their place in the 
official discourse. This re-emphasis on ideology marks a definite departure from 
the accustomed reform era tradition. The phenomenon is not restricted to official 
discourse alone. In fact, it gained strong stimulus from the underlying society in 
the form of intellectual leftist debate and waves of popular Maoist nostalgia. 
The question of a possible ideological turnaround is of specific interest as the 
party begins preparations for its upcoming 100
th
 anniversary in 2021. The 
centennial has repeatedly been referred to as the final deadline for completing the 
reform targets.
10
  
1.1 Research Questions 
In this study I aim to participate in the academic discussion revolving around CCP 
legitimacy by highlighting possible additional ways of the party leadership to 
justify its rule amidst the so-called third revolution. During this time, the party has 
encountered a bundle of challenges stemming from the negative impacts of 
economic reforms and globalization. In this new situation, CCP leaders cannot 
afford to view political legitimacy as their permanent possession.
11
 As David 
Shambaugh argues, even one-party systems must from time to time re-legitimate 
themselves by finding alternative ways to address the needs of the people.
 12
 
This study examines the party’s legitimacy strategies and the rhetoric its two most 
recent leaders have used to ensure the continuity of their position. The greatest 
                                                 
9
 Holbig, Heike (2009): Remaking the CCP’s ideology: Determinants, Progress and Limits under 
Hu Jintao. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 3, 38. 
10
 See for example: Yanliang, Li (2013): The Third Plenum’s Effect on China’s Foreign Policy. 
China US Focus, 6.12.2013. 
<http://www.chinausfocus.com/political-social-development/the-third-plenums-ffect-on-chinas-
foreign-policy/> Last retrieved 18.8.2014. 
11
 Teets, Jessica – Rosen, Stanley – Gries, Peter Hays (2010): Introduction. In Gries, Peter Hayes - 
Rosen Stanley (ed.): Chinese Politics - State, society and the market. Routledge, New York, 17. 
12
 Shambaugh, David L. (2008): China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, Washington, 3. 
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interest here is targeted at whether the growing criticism towards the reform 
process has forced the CCP to take a leap back in history and substantially change 
its legitimacy basis by re-introducing elements of Maoist ideology as the main 
source of its power justification. At the same time, it is good to remember that the 
party is not a monolithic organization. Deviations from the official line reveal 
much about the tensions and internal power struggles that go behind the closed 
doors. 
The research questions are:  
1. What kind of legitimacy strategy the CCP has used to justify its 
power during the so-called third revolution?  
2. Is a return back to the age of ideology currently underway, ending 
the 30-year old tradition of performance-based legitimacy?  
3. Are there any major themes that are repeatedly expressed in the 
party leadership speeches, public statements or political agendas 
during the reigns of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping? What underlying 
values and attitudes do they convey?  
I have touched upon the topic in my Bachelor’s thesis in 2012, where I focused on 
Secretary-General Hu Jintao's era.
13
 In this study, I will connect both of the 21
st
 
century party leaders in the same continuum, and will try to analyze their rhetoric 
as part of a broader transformation taking place in the Chinese society. 
1.2 Sources 
The primary sources of this study comprise of keynote speeches by General-
Secretaries Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, National Party Congress reports and its 
plenary session publications, along with policy formulations and other official 
CCP documents during the time period of 2002-2014. 
Keynote speeches usually follow along the lines of commonly accepted 
agreements in the party machinery. Instead of revealing much of the speakers’ 
personal thinking, the content of these speeches is strictly regulated by the will of 
the majority and can thus be seen as an indicator of a much more long-lasting 
                                                 
13 Ranta, Jannika (2012): Performance vs. Ideology. The Chinese Communist Party´s Quest for Political 
Legitimacy in the Hu Jintao Era. Unpublished Bachelor´s Thesis, Political History. University of Helsinki. 
 5 
 
policy orientation. They are also aimed to address multiple audiences 
simultaneously.
14
 Keynote speeches take place during major party events, such as 
CCP anniversaries or Party Congresses convening at five year intervals. 
Leadership speeches in anniversary commemorations are of particular interest as 
they usually date right before Congress meetings, sketching general guidelines 
about their presumable results.
15
  
National Party Congress (NPC) is officially the highest party authority.
 
The main 
task of the Congress and its 2,000 delegates is to select from its ranks members to 
the Central Committee, which convenes annually in plenary meetings and 
exercises official power when the NPC is not in session. In these meetings policy 
drafts formulated at an upper level of the party pyramid, such as revisions of the 
CCP Constitution, are formally approved. The Central Committee has some 200 
full members. While as such too large to effectively rule the party, it approves the 
members of two of its most important party organs – the Politburo and Politburo 
Standing Committee. The Politburo Standing Committee is the CCP’s major 
decision-making body with only seven members, including the Party General-
Secretary. In general, NPC and Central Committee documents serve as key 
predictors of future policy by setting agendas and objectives for the next five 
years. The centerpiece of all documents is the NPC keynote address by Party 
General-Secretary. Besides the actual outcomes of the meetings, these kind of 
huge mass events also have symbolic value as an exhibition of party prestige and 
uniformity.
16
  
The above mentioned material is available in English language versions on CCP 
official websites or via state-owned news outlets. The use of additional primary 
sources is restricted by my limited Chinese language skills. I am aware of the 
potential problems caused by using only non-Chinese material, but am also 
confident that tenuous native language skills should not act as an insurmountable 
barrier disallowing academic analysis of research topics situated in a foreign 
cultural sphere. I also believe that precisely these translated texts and speeches 
                                                 
14
 Kluver, Alan (1996): Legitimating the Chinese Economic Reforms. A rhetoric of myth and 
orthodoxy. State University of New York Press, Albany, 10. 
15
 Gang, Qiang (2011): How to Read Hu’s July 1st Speech? China Media Project, 12.7.2011. 
<http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/07/12/13735/> Last retrieved 19.8.2014. 
16
 Saich, 114 
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might be very helpful in determining the party's official line as they are subject to 
careful scanning and often the end results of a highly regulated editing process.
17
  
I will also make extensive use of the variety of academic articles and research 
literature debating on the subject of CCP legitimacy. Although a certain degree of 
consensus about the Chinese one-party system’s power base can be said to exist, 
the development of the past decade has given rise to alternative ways of 
understanding the party’s position. One of such views is held by Dr. Heike 
Holbig, a German Political Science Professor, who believes that conventional 
explanatory models are increasingly out-of-date and no longer fit the framework 
of 21
st
 century China.  The aim of this study is to participate in this discussion by 
building on Holbig’s notion of the stabilizing effect of ideology and culture. 
Another important group of sources comprise of news articles from both China 
and abroad. Official media outlets often mirror the party's ideological position, 
thus giving valuable information about the views of the current leadership. Xinhua 
news agency, China Daily and People’s Daily newspapers are widely known for 
their status as party mouthpieces. Their reporters are likely to emulate the official 
party line by using only above approved rhetorical formulations.
18
 Moreover, a 
significant part of major speeches and communiques are only published through 
state-owned media. 
As the timeline of this study is focused on relatively recent history, overall 
academic assessments of both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping tenures are still few and 
far between. The concept of political legitimacy, on the other hand, does not fall 
short of academic contributions. The works of Max Weber and Jürgen Habermas 
have proven to be good starting points in defining the term. In addition, many 
prominent China scholars, such as Dingxin Zhao and Alan Kluver, have through 
their research provided me with important insights into the application of the 
concept within Chinese cultural and traditional context.  
                                                 
17
 Kluver, 11-12. 
18
 Sandby-Thomas, Peter (2011): Legitimating the Chinese Communist Party since Tiananmen. A 
critical analysis of the stability discourse. Routledge, London & New York, 36-37. 
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1.3 Methodology 
Research topic and source material greatly determine the choice of 
methodological approach. In this case, both guide the research towards rhetorical 
analysis. I will try to find examples of possible changes in CCP legitimacy 
strategies by applying Chaïm Perelman’s argumentation theory within the context 
of Chinese rhetorical tradition.  
1.3.1 New Rhetoric and Perelman’s argumentation theory 
Rhetorical analysis is often mistakenly understood as a single study subject or a 
method. Instead, the approach entails traditions that are many and varied. 
Rhetorical analysis can be done in different ways, depending on the level of 
language the study is directed at.
19
  
New Rhetoric research tradition is based on the fundamental idea that language is 
present at all times. The main interest lies in the critical analysis of rhetoric, 
focusing not on the structure or technology, but rather on the means by which 
various claims are being made credible.
20
 By analyzing the source material, it is 
possible to examine how selected versions of reality are made compelling and 
acceptable to the chosen target audience.
21
 
The view that all argumentation is developed in relation to an audience is central 
to Perelman’s theory. Since argumentation is aimed at acquiring and strengthening 
the public’s approval, it can never happen in isolation. The intended results, as 
well as the means of argumentation, must be adapted to meet the nature of the 
audience. For Perelman, audience is comprised of all those people who the 
speaker wishes to influence, be that a single person or any unspecified number of 
listeners. The latter is an example of universal audience, which is the opposite of 
                                                 
19
 Palonen, Kari –Summa, Hilkka (1998): Johdanto: Retorinen käänne? In Palonen Kari - Summa 
Hilkka (ed.): Pelkkää retoriikkaa. Vastapaino, Tampere, 7. 
20
 Jokinen, Arja (1999a): Diskurssianalyysin suhde sukulaistraditioihin. In Jokinen, Arja – Juhila, 
Kirsi – Suoninen, Eero (ed.): Diskurssianalyysi liikkeessä, 2nd edition. Vastapaino, Tampere, 47. 
21
 Jokinen, Arja (1999b): Vakuuttelevan ja suostuttelevan retoriikan analysoiminen. In Jokinen, 
Arja – Juhila, Kirsi – Suoninen, Eero (ed.): Diskurssianalyysi liikkeessä, 2nd edition. Vastapaino, 
Tampere, 126. 
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particular audience, whose composition and interests are known to the speaker in 
advance.
22
  
In order to achieve the desired effect, the speaker must adjust his or hers 
performance according to the audience. Therefore it is vital to begin with 
generally accepted premises after which the speaker can try to extend the approval 
to include also the new arguments made.
23
 Premises refer to commonly shared 
presumptions that the audience in not likely to call into question. These silent 
agreements can stem from two sources: truths/facts or values. To be able to 
elevate the latter group into generally accepted premises requires a high level of 
abstraction as opposed to factual argumentation that can more easily be 
endorsed.
24
  
Although Perelman was more a philosopher than an expert in political science, his 
argumentation theory suits well the analysis of political texts and speeches. The 
importance of persuasion to regime legitimacy cannot be denied. Especially 
authoritarian regimes depend on strengthening the public belief in their leadership 
qualities and willingness to work for the good of the people.
25
 
The application of this method is particularly interesting in the case of the CCP. 
The third revolution has led to the formation of several different audiences with 
conflicting interests and hopes for the future.
26
 What, then, are the audiences that 
the CCP is trying to assure of its legitimate status? And which underlying values 
has it chosen to base its rhetoric on? Examining these premises can reveal much 
of the party’s possible ideological turnaround, and whether the reform period is 
still seen as an indisputable success story or if that master narrative has already 
lost its allure. 
                                                 
22
 Summa, Hilkka (1998): Kolme näkökulmaa uuteen retoriikkaan. In Palonen, Kari – Summa, 
Hilkka (ed.): Pelkkää retoriikkaa, Vastapaino, 67. 
23
 Perelman, Chaïm (1996): Retoriikan valtakunta. Vastapaino, Tampere, 28. 
24
 Summa, 70. 
25
 Bondes, Maria – Heep, Sandra (2013): Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Persuasion 
and Legitimacy: Official Framing in the Case of the Chinese Communist Party. Journal of Chinese 
Political Science, Vol. 18, Issue 4, 317. 
26
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As New Rhetoric pays attention to all kinds of interaction situations, it may be a 
useful approach in evaluating the often very subtle and diverse ways of legitimacy 
building. Not only the carefully considered words, but also the symbolic actions 
of the CCP leadership tell a lot about the possible changes in the hegemonic 
discourse.  
1.3.2 Rhetorical analysis in Chinese cultural context 
Any scholar is inevitably the prison of his or her own subconscious attitudes and 
cultural presumptions. In analyzing the rhetoric of Chinese political leaders, one 
must at all times bear in mind the possible differences between the East and the 
West, and try to avoid assessing the research object with exclusively Western 
rhetorical principles. 
Edward W. Said is perhaps one of the most influential representatives of post-
colonial criticism. In his book “Orientalism”, Said points out that the West has 
consciously created an image of Asia and the Middle East that best fits its own 
purposes. Orient has thus in research and literature been represented as an 
example otherness and an opposite to Western notion of norms. His views have 
since been widely debated, but they nevertheless have helped raise awareness of 
cultural pitfalls.
27
 Despite efforts, Western rhetoric is still often viewed as the 
standard to which all other rhetoric traditions are compared to. This defiency 
model thinking fails to acknowledge Eastern rhetoric tradition in its own terms – 
different surely, but not non-existent, incomprehensible or otherwise inferior.
28
  
Ray Heisey and Alan Kluver are communication scholars who have examined 
CCP’s legitimacy strategies during the previous transition era. Both emphasize the 
importance of culture in their analyses of Chinese political rhetoric. 
While all leaders may in principle believe in rhetorical inventiveness, their 
strategies for persuasion are in fact strictly limited. In China, these rhetorical 
constraints derive from the history and culture of the country, not least from the 
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Confucian school of thought.
29
 Culture and history not only limit the speaker's 
room for maneuver but they also serve as an important source of rhetorical tactics.
 
Both Heisey and Kluver share the idea of culture shaping official discourse: 
national leaders use their own background, history and national identity when 
constructing their political messages.
30
 
Chinese political rhetoric has many characteristic features that separate it from the 
Western tradition. In Western countries, rhetoric often follows the line of logical 
inference, which does not have the same value in the holistic tradition of Chinese 
political discourse. While both aim to persuade their audiences, in China, this 
happens more through analogies and metaphors than as a result of logical 
reasoning. In addition, the legitimation of the regime and its politics take place in 
a strictly top-down fashion.
31
 Congress speeches as well as other important party 
documents serve as indicators of the current ideological stance of the CCP 
leadership, revealing the boundaries of correct belief. The official discourse is 
usually theoretical and value-laden with the ulterior motive of stressing the 
unchanging role of the party.
32
  
It is interesting how well Perelman’s argumentation theory complements the 
traditional Chinese understanding of political discourse. With both, the main 
interest lies in the hidden values behind persuasion. Language is first and 
foremost a utilitarian tool for obtaining the acceptance of the target audience. 
To gain at least somewhat neutral view on the topic, it is vital to acknowledge any 
possible cultural biases and be aware of them throughout the research process.
33
 
Acknowledging the differences in Chinese tradition should not, however, be 
turned into a false conception of incomprehensible foreignness. Re-enforcing the 
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colonial perception of otherness is just as erroneous as it is to discard all cultural 
relevance.  
 12 
 
2 Theoretical Framework 
This chapter focuses on the theoretical background of the study. I will first define 
the concept of legitimacy both in academic terms and in the context of Chinese 
cultural tradition. I will then move on to examine the research question more 
closely by tracing the main features of political legitimacy throughout the CCP 
history.  
2.1 Defining Legitimacy 
It is safe to say that the question of political legitimacy is universal, affecting 
regimes ranging from democracies to dictatorships. There are many competing 
definitions of legitimacy, but Max Weber’s conceptualization of the term is 
widely applied as a standard framework for analyses.
34
 His work will provide the 
starting point for understanding political legitimacy also in this study.  
In its broadest terms, legitimacy can be understood as recognition of the ruler’s 
right to rule. What is special in Weber’s formulation of legitimacy is the notion 
that all power is relational - not a possession. It stems from others’ belief in the 
rightfulness of the regime.
35
 Seymour Martin Lipset has further explained the 
relational nature of the concept. Lipset describes legitimacy as “the capacity of the 
system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions 
are the most appropriate ones for the society”.36  
Weberian model includes three different modes or sources of legitimation: 
1. Legal-rational 
2. Charismatic 
3. Traditional37 
The legal-rational mode is built upon the notion of legality and the right of 
authorities to practice their profession under jointly respected rules. Whereas the 
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first mode of legitimation is mostly concerned with institutional power, the second 
relies heavily on individual personality. Charismatic leader is someone endowed 
with exceptional powers or qualities that make people want to submit themselves 
to the superhuman-like leadership. According to Weber, this mode is the most 
unstable one, likely to emerge in times of crisis. The third and final mode of 
legitimacy combines elements of the two previous examples. This mode refers to 
a regime where the ruler applies contemporary methods or political ideas within 
the limits of traditional conventions. Traditional mode of legitimation has its 
origins in monarchies and other pre-democratic forms of governments.
38
  
While Weber has himself acknowledged that these modes are only ideal types, 
never intended to fully describe the complex phenomenon of political legitimacy, 
his formulations have nevertheless received much criticism.
39
  One of the most 
persistent critiques accuses Weber for narrow reference to Western understanding 
of political legitimacy. This kind of restricted approach fails to incorporate the 
historical, moral and cultural incentives for regime justification.
40
 Chenshan Tian 
specifically warns of forcing the Weberian model to Chinese political leadership 
as the intricacies and distinctive features of Chinese cultural tradition cannot be 
perfectly expressed in foreign terms and categories.
41
  
According to Jürgen Habermas, the moral base for legitimacy claims reflects the 
dominant values within society.
42
 Consequently, the rhetoric of legitimation is 
never out of tune with the underlying societal beliefs and attitudes.
43
 Dingxin 
Zhao has further pointed out that Weber’s formulation falsely separates the 
rational and emotional sides of regime justification that in reality often intertwine 
in people’s minds.44 Many contemporary China scholars have thus sought to 
complement Weber’s notions with additional modes of legitimation – especially 
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communist ideology and, more recently, a performance-based mode of CCP 
authority.
45
  
Zhao has developed an updated version of the Weberian model to better match the 
particularities in Chinese political and cultural tradition. According to him, 
legitimacy in China can be traced back to: 
1. Legal-electoral system 
2. Ideology 
3. Performance46 
A regime based on legal-electoral system upholds the idea of law as a binding 
principle and further secures it legitimacy by electing its leaders. Ideological 
legitimacy rests on the belief that a ruler’s right to rule is justified by a certain 
value system originating from tradition, religion or political philosophy. In 
contrast, performance-based legitimacy derives from the state’s overall 
performance ability, especially in the fields of economy and morality. As in 
Weber’s original model, these modes represent the ideal forms of legitimation and 
cannot be strictly viewed as alternatives to each other. However, in one country at 
a particular time, usually only one mode prevails.
47
 
With the help of this conceptualization, I aim to examine what currently 
constitutes the main sources of CCP political legitimacy. Before doing so, I must, 
however, outline the culturally and historically embedded values attached to 
political legitimacy in China. 
2.2 Traditional aspects of political legitimacy in China  
China has over 4,000-year old history of governance. The question of legitimacy 
is therefore deeply rooted in Chinese political tradition. All regimes throughout 
the history have had to face the issue of power justification but, as Tong argues, 
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nowhere else than in China has it evoked such profound perceptions of the state’s 
responsibilities towards the society.
48
    
In Dynastic China, the legitimacy of rulers came from the so-called “Mandate of 
Heaven”. This legitimating process had three overlapping layers that together 
ensured the longevity of the regime. Morality of the ruling elite - an idea that was 
further emphasized with the acceptance of Confucianism as the official state 
ideology
49
 - constitutes the first and the most crucial layer. A just and righteous 
ruler was under the protection of heaven, and thus entitled to his position.
50
 
Ruler’s virtuous behavior and the subsequent contentment of the people were to 
act as the true measures of his political legitimacy.
51
  
A key component of elite morality was benevolent governance, which Confucius 
summed up as “showing compassionate care for the people”. Besides fairness and 
equality in administration, an ideal government would look after the materialistic 
wellbeing as well as the ethical and moral guidance of the people. This kind of 
omnipotent state responsibility has distinct paternalistic overtones and is a typical 
example of the Chinese parental official. Benevolent governance, in turn, relied 
upon meritocratic rule. In an ideal society, all leaders possessed superior virtues 
and talent. They had been recruited and trained by the government to take up 
demanding positions at different levels of the society.
 52
 
In short, this complex pattern of political legitimacy can be described as follows: 
government by virtue and talent derives its Mandate of Heaven by fulfilling its 
moral responsibility of benevolent rule and by trying to win the hearts and minds 
of the people. At the very core of it is a traditional idea of ”minben”, a people-
centric outlook that expects the ruler to “look after the welfare of their people, 
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take care of the people‘s interests and listen to the people‘s voices and 
concerns”.53 
Ever since the imperial times, the Mandate of Heaven has been used to justify 
both revolutions and the formation of new regimes.
54
 Heaven granted the ruler the 
right to rule, but the blessing was not permanent. The support could be withdrawn 
the moment the regime proved unworthy or otherwise failed to fulfill its above 
mentioned duties. This was usually signaled by natural disasters or military 
defeats, giving people cue to rise into a revolt.
55
  
In addition to legitimacy by the Mandate of Heaven, traditional Chinese political 
culture places great importance on ideas of stability, unity and harmony. In 
Confucian school of thought, harmony is perceived as the universal way of the 
world – a total order in which everything has its place and time.  This could best 
be accomplished in a society with strict hierarchical structure. Confucianism is 
based on five relationships that reflect the correct division of authority and social 
status: 
1. Ruler-subject 
2. Father-son 
3. Husband-wife 
4. Older brother-younger brother 
5. Friend-friend.
56
 
A hierarchical nature of society highlights the holistic world view of traditional 
China. While Western philosophy puts the individual at the center of the focus, 
Confucianism sees the same person as an inseparable part of the surrounding 
society.  Concerned with maintaining harmony and stability, Confucian tradition 
celebrates the hierarchical logic of universe, where all people perform their duties 
and obey their superiors. A good and legitimate government is like a stern, 
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committed father who demands respect and loyalty from all his children alike.
57
 It 
has even been argued, that the most important factor shaping the Chinese politics 
has in fact been this cultural longing for a heroic “great man” in power.58  
Desire for harmony and obedience to authority are common features in both 
traditional and contemporary China. While much has changed over time and many 
features of traditional Chinese culture were consciously destroyed during the 
communist revolution, Confucian values and perspectives are deeply rooted and 
continue to play an important role in the legitimation of the CCP.
59
  
2.3 State Legitimacy in Modern China 
It is a commonly shared understanding among scholars that the beginning of the 
reform era and ultimately the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 marked a clear 
turning point for the CCP.  Here, I will briefly go through both the original 
legitimacy sources as well as the more recent power justification rising from the 
successful economic reforms and the pragmatic performance strategy. After 
examining the central features of both these traditions, I will try to manifest the 
limits of the reform era system that lately has been subjected to extensive 
criticism.  
2.3.1 Socialist revolution and the original legitimacy of the CCP 
The original legitimacy of the CCP was a result of the Chinese Civil War and the 
subsequent founding of the PRC in 1949. People were displeased with the 
incapable republican regime that was accused of corruption and inability to fight 
back to foreign invaders. Revolutionary discourse signaled a different kind of 
attitude, providing the party with its initial ruling mandate. In addition to this 
early justification, the CCP also built its legitimacy upon Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong thought.  This scientific development theory would guide the country 
towards the ultimate goal of reaching a communist society.
60
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Mao Zedong, the founding father of the PRC and the first Chairman of the CCP, 
used both of these sources to justify his regime. Communist propaganda showed 
how Mao had unselfishly sacrificed his own family members for the greater 
revolutionary cause. The party also stressed the ideological and moral superiority 
of the Chairman, thus helping to generate a picture of the most virtuous leader in 
all of history: 
“The East is red; the sun rises. China has Mao Zedong. He seeks 
happiness for his people and he is the great savior.”61 
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought or Maoist doctrine remains the official 
ideology of the CCP even today, although its position is fundamentally different 
from what is was in the early years of the PRC. The doctrine is difficult to boil 
down to just a few paragraphs, but there are some distinct features that must be 
reviewed to better understand the political legitimacy of the Mao-era CCP. 
One of the most striking elements of the Maoist thought was its fanatical 
nationalism. For many, Mao was a symbol of national rejuvenation and modern 
emergence of China.
62
 His strong resentment towards the West stemmed from 
past experiences when the country was divided and humiliated by foreign powers 
entering its soil. Mao pledged to restore China’s lost self-esteem and make it once 
again a key player in global world politics.
63
 
Secondly, Maoism relied heavily on social and economic equality. In the Western 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine, urban proletariat was believed to form the backbone of 
the revolution. In Maoist ideology, however, popular support was largely 
dependent on the vast number of poor and uneducated rural masses.
64
 The 
socialist revolution would provide these less advantaged people with an 
egalitarian society free of exploitation, elite corruption and social insecurities.
65
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Although Mao appeared to be a vigorous anti-traditionalist – blaming the old 
imperial regimes for the country’s degradation – he nevertheless used rhetoric that 
bore striking resemblance to Confucian philosophy. The CCP discourse of the 
time was full of moral teachings.
66
 He cherished the traditional idea of minben 
and declared himself as the true follower of the “mass line”. In a speech in 
October 1944, Mao declared that:   
“One must act in accordance with the needs and wishes of the 
masses. All work for the masses must start from their need and not 
from the desire of any individual, however well-intended.”67  
In an ideal society, CCP cadres were to maintain close ties with the masses that, in 
turn, were to supervise and offer criticism for their leaders.
68
 While this 
authorized people to take power, ultimately the control rested in the hands of the 
party, creating a renewed version of the paternalist father figure. All of the 
revolutionary goals and improvements in people’s lives could only be attained 
under the control of the party-state: 
“Without the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party, without the 
Chinese Communists as the mainstay of the Chinese people, China 
can never achieve independence and liberation, or industrialization 
and the modernization of her agriculture”.69  
The end of Mao’s rule and the original justification of the CCP legitimacy drew 
closer as the devastation of Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) began to unfold. 
When coupled together with a massive earthquake in northern China in 1976 as 
well as the deaths of a military commander-in-chief and, soon after, Mao himself, 
the withdrawal of divine support seemed more than obvious.
70
  
In this situation, it was necessary to steer the country towards a new era. After the 
implementation of a radically different policy line, the initial legitimacy sources 
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of revolution and ideology slowly lost their value and turned into a somewhat of a 
problematic burden for the new CCP leadership.
71
 
2.3.2 “Poverty is not socialism” – Legitimacy in the reform era 
Despite Mao’s feverish attempts to create a modern communist society, China 
continued to be among the poorest and least developed countries in the world. The 
need for political and ideological re-adjustment was evident. The unique era of 
economic and social reforms that soon followed, has often been referred to as the 
second revolution of China, greatly differing from the ideological landscape of the 
previous decades.  
New sources of political legitimacy first started to evolve under the leadership of 
Deng Xiaoping. While Deng never held office as either head of state or General-
Secretary of the party, he was an undisputed authority and the personalization of 
CCP power. In 1978, Deng famously expressed the need to “seek truth from 
facts”. This kind of pragmatic approach was officially adopted at the 11th NPC in 
1978 in which the “Four Modernizations” -policies - a set of economic priorities 
in which resources were to be devoted to national defense, agriculture, science 
and industry - were given a primary status. It marked a significant disruption to 
the old routine. Suddenly socialist revolution was secondary to the greater cause 
of advancing technology and increasing the volume of trade.
72
  
Since the history and legitimacy of the party was still closely linked to the 
memory of Mao’s leadership, it was unthinkable to completely repudiate the 
former Chairman. Deng understood that even if the CCP could not abandon Mao 
completely, it desperately needed to de-glorify the man behind the myth in order 
to move forward with reforms.
73
  
Thus, in the 1981 “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of our Party 
since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China”, it was for the first time 
officially stated that chief responsibility for the grave errors of Cultural 
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Revolution lay with Chairman Mao Zedong. However, at the same time, the 
resolution reminded that Mao’s contributions to the Chinese revolution as a whole 
were far greater than his mistakes.
74
 Later, it was concluded that Mao was 70 
percent good and only 30 percent bad.
75
 In his speech to the drafting committee of 
the resolution, Deng further stressed the complex relationship between the party 
and the Chairman:  
“On no account can we discard the banner of Mao Zedong Thought. 
To do so would, in fact, be to negate the glorious history of our 
Party. The appraisal of Comrade Mao Zedong and the exposition of 
the Mao Zedong Thought relate not only to Mao personally but also 
to the entire history of our party and our country.”76 
As the reform and opening up policies gathered pace, Chinese economy started to 
flourish. This had a legitimating effect for the entire CCP regime: the general 
public had once again a good reason to perceive the party as mandated by 
Heaven.
77
  
While a huge majority of the people was satisfied with the reform policies, there 
were others, who, as a result of the more open atmosphere, began to show 
increasing criticism towards the authoritarian regime.
78
 This dissatisfaction and 
yearning for more freedom culminated in the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
demonstrations. The party finally managed to silence the voices contesting its 
authority and calling for more democracy, but in doing so, severely tarnished its 
own public image. The party tried to cling on to the remains of its credibility by 
taking a short-lived turn to the left in the years immediately following the crisis. 
The effect of this superficial ideological education campaign did not, however, 
prove to be very successful.
 79
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Despite all the chaos, the post-Tiananmen years came to mark an important 
milestone in modern CCP history as the high point of China’s second revolution. 
What is important to notice here is that, in the end, even the forceful crackdown 
on opposition and the subsequent erosion of party legitimacy did not put a stop to 
the reform process. On the contrary, it urged the party to speed up modernization 
and let go of the remnants of ideological power justification.
80
  
The role of Deng Xiaoping’s Southern tour in 1992 has afterwards been seen as 
decisive. During the tour, Deng visited four major coastal cities in southern China 
that were the symbols of new economic policies. The end result of the widely 
reported journey was the final ratification of his power and the disappearance of 
leftist influences in Chinese political arena. Deng argued that further reforms were 
absolutely necessary to maintain the party’s leading position, and pointed the 
finger at old school socialists standing in the way of progress. This was a key 
transformation in CCP rhetoric. Now, the greatest threat to the system came not 
from the right, but from the left.
81
   
The CCP publicized its ambitions to establish a full market economy at the 14
th
 
Party Congress in the fall of 1992.
82
 Similarly, the adjusted version of socialist 
ideology now equaled constant development: 
“In the final analysis, the criterion for judging the success of our 
work in various fields is whether it helps develop the productive 
forces of socialist society, strengthen the overall capacity of the 
country and improve the people’s standard of living.”83  
Masses no longer guided the party line as peasants and workers, for whom the 
party had originally fought the revolution for, were no longer given a priority.
84
 
This de facto elimination of the ideological side of CCP legitimacy led to the birth 
of a new pragmatic model based on attaining concrete and measurable goals.
85
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This so-called performance-based legitimacy is perhaps best described as a “social 
contract” between the party and the society, in which the Chinese people give 
their political and civil liberties in exchange for continuous improvements in their 
living standards.
86
  
In order to create the best possible conditions for marketization, the CCP could 
not sustain the Maoist rhetoric of class enemies and the evils of capitalism. 
Instead, the party opted for creating closer ties with the new social elite.
87
 
Suddenly it was glorious to get rich and perfectly acceptable to let some get there 
before others: 
“Poverty is not socialism, but it is impossible for everyone to 
become prosperous simultaneously. We must allow and encourage 
some areas and individuals to grow rich first, so that more and more 
areas and individuals will do so until common prosperity is 
eventually achieved.”88 
Economic success brought with it a wave of national pride that the Chinese had 
long craved for.  The CCP did not fail to capitalize on the patriotic sentiments of 
the people who had been taught to view China as an ancient “central kingdom” 
(Zhongguo) falling victim to Western and Japanese cruelties in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 
centuries. Mao himself had dismissed the time period as a shameful reminiscence 
of national weakness. The post-1989 regime, however, decided to take advantage 
of the painful past and introduced a “victimization narrative” that helped to vent 
frustration overseas.
89
 Promotion of nationalism also conveniently distracted the 
people by directing critique away from the country’s internal challenges.90   
If economic growth and national unity formed the first two pillars of performance-
based legitimacy, the third and perhaps most critical one was the imperative call 
for social stability. Class struggle and mobilization were cast aside and stability 
elevated as the highest principle without which none of the material good could be 
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attained. A stable society was a prerequisite for development. The party 
propaganda machinery was successful in linking up this positive attribute 
specifically to the leadership of the CCP. The narrative gave the party leadership 
an opportunity to discredit those challenging its monopoly on power by depicting 
itself as the only guarantor of stability. This was not a trivial move when kept in 
mind the nation’s strong cultural preference for harmony and unison.91  
The pragmatic approach of performance-based legitimacy was central to the 
“Three Represent” theory, formulated by Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin. 
According to the theory, CCP represents the development of advanced productive 
forces, the promotion of advanced culture and the interests of the majority of the 
Chinese people. As such, the theory was the embodiment of the CCP’s ideological 
transformation in the late reform era. With the incorporation of a new social 
hierarchy, the original proletarian cause was quietly forgotten and merged 
together with the needs of the rising middle class.
92
 The theory was added to the 
party constitution in 2002. 
2.3.3 Pushing the limits of performance 
It is a well-established fact that ideological legitimacy deficit forced the party to 
seek new grounds for its authoritarian position during China’s second revolution 
from 1970’s to 1990’s. However, the applicability of the performance-based 
legitimacy model on today’s China is another question. The country is now 
entering its third period of major social transformation as the negative impacts of 
reform process have begun to surface.
93
 This puts the thus far applied model under 
a severe strain. 
While record fast GDP growth has surely benefited the CCP in rebuilding its 
legitimacy during the difficult transition years, there are limits to its capacity to 
yield more wealth. Social scientists refer to this as “performance dilemma”, which 
stresses the highly unstable nature of legitimacy based on growth rates.
94
 In an 
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ideal situation, economic growth brings increasing amounts of prosperity to the 
middle class, who, as an act of both gratitude and greed, gives its support to the 
regime. In other words, authoritarian rule is accepted as a precondition for further 
economic success. T. J Pempel sees this kind of developmental state model as 
emblematic to many East Asian countries.
95
 Yet, such legitimacy strategy entails a 
promise of continuous improvements that eventually is impossible to keep. 
Neither the CCP nor other regimes have the kind of power to guarantee a never-
ending rise of living standards to meet the people’s growing expectations.96  
After a long run of startling growth rates, Chinese economy has finally shown 
signs of slowing down. As an inseparable part of global market system, the 
country can no longer fully protect itself from external impacts.
97
 The 2008 
Global Financial Crisis dropped China’s GDP growth under 10 per cent for the 
first time in nearly a decade, and the rise back on top has not gone quite as 
planned.
98
 Former Premier Zhu Rongji has argued that if the growth rate keeps on 
falling under the critical level of 7 per cent, at risk is not only the peaceful 
development of Chinese society, but also the future of the CCP rule.
 99
   
Figure 1: China’s GDP Growth 
 Source: The World Bank. 
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Likewise, the encouragement of nationalistic sentiment can work both in favor 
and against the regime.
100
 Besides spurring loyalty towards the ruling elite, it can 
also bind the hands of the leadership by forcing it to promote policies that are at 
odds with the greater scheme of things.
101
 Frictions between state-led official 
nationalism and popular nationalism outside the control of the CCP have the 
potential of escalating into unwanted confrontations between citizens and party 
authority. The Angry Youth Movement, a group of young people anxious to 
restore China’s glory, is one example of such agitation. While mostly loud critics 
of the West, the members equally find fault in the Chinese government and party 
elite who, according to them, are not sufficiently defending the country’s global 
interests. This critic was most illustrative in the 1996 best-seller book “China Can 
Say No” and its 2009 sequel “Unhappy China”. The popularity of both of the 
books is a good reminder of the complexities associated with nationalistic 
legitimacy strategies.
102
  
While one cannot discredit the importance of social stability in Chinese political 
system, as a source of legitimacy, it seems to be just as flaky and delicate as the 
two previously mentioned features of performance-based tradition.  
Since the early 2000’s, the negative side effects of the reform policies - income 
disparities, corruption, collapse of public health care and welfare system, 
unemployment, and environmental problems - have led to waves of anger and 
anxiety that greatly undermines the durability of the one-party system.
103
 
Although most episodes of civil unrest go unreported, there is still an important 
observation to be made: the number of these “mass incidents” has steadily risen 
from just 8,700 cases in 1994 to over 90,000 in 2006.
104
 It is estimated that the 
number of annual riots and protest now revolves somewhere around 180,000. 
What is more, these large and sometimes even violent outbursts of discontent are 
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now more frequent in economically thriving big cities than in small and remote 
rural villages.
105
  
Most of the protests are caused by various social disputes. Rapid economic 
growth of the past decades has not come to benefit the whole nation equally. 
Instead, wealth is disproportionately distributed between the different social 
classes as well as between the urban and rural regions. Even the state-owned 
newspaper China Daily alerted that the “growing income gap is increasingly 
worrisome for the government of once-egalitarian China”.106 While the number of 
millionaires increases, many ordinary Chinese have had to say goodbye to full 
employment and witness the run-down of state-owned companies along with 
massive layoffs of workers.  
Examining China’s Gini Coefficient is another good way to get a grasp of the 
seriousness of the situation. Gini coefficient is a widely used tool for measuring 
the levels of income inequality. The coefficient variable is given a value between 
0 and 1, in which 0 represent perfect equality and 1 perfect inequality.
107
 
Figure 2: Gini Coefficient in China 
Source: The World Bank. 
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In recent years, the figure has exceeded the internationally acknowledged 
threshold of 0.4, signaling a risk of widespread social unrest.
108
 While no official 
data has been released, foreign news outlets believe the situation in 2014 to be 
even more critical. China’s Gini coefficient allegedly now lies somewhere around 
0.55, which is among the highest values in the world.
109
  
Both money and power are concentrated in the hands of the same well-to-do 
minority,
110
 which causes additional bitterness towards the ruling elite. In 
particular many senior party officials and their offspring have taken advantage of 
the defective system.
111
 In 2006, Politburo member and Shanghai Party Secretary, 
Chen Liangyu, was publicly dismissed of his duties after what was said to be 
China’s biggest corruption scandal in more than 10 years.112 In July 2014, the 
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection announced that China’s former 
security chief and a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, Zhou 
Yongkang, was put under investigation. He is currently the highest ranking 
official accused with corruption charges.
113
 
The rampant corruption has not gone unnoticed. An online opinion poll run by the 
state-owned Chinanews.com in 2009 showed that 75.5 per cent of Chinese named 
corruption and cleaner government as their “top concern”.114 In international 
rankings of government transparency, China clearly lags behind all developed 
countries. The Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International scores 
countries on a scale from 0 to 100, according to their perceived level of public 
sector corruption. A low score indicates a case of severe corruption whereas a 
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high score stands for a non-corrupt government. In 2013, China received a score 
of 40, which entitled it to 80
th
 position on the ranking list of 175 countries.
115
  
Figure 3: China´s Corruption Perception Index (CPI)  
 
Source: Transparency International. 
 
Much of these negative aftereffects weaken the already difficult position of the 
country’s disadvantaged groups. However, pollution and other environmental 
problems also largely affect the everyday life of the growing middle and upper 
class.
116
 Environment related unrest has gone up by almost 30 per cent each 
year,
117
 and to make the matter even more serious, these protests have now 
entered China’s flagship coastal cities.118 In 2011, massive riots took place right 
outside of Shanghai when a solar-panel manufacturing plant was accused of 
contaminating a nearby river.
119
 Besides environmental degradation, the long line 
of food scandals, including tainted meat and counterfeit baby formulas, is another 
symptom of the increased indifference that many citizens find typical of the 
profit-driven reform period.  
All these issues illustratively demonstrate the shortcomings of performance-based 
legitimacy tradition. The currently ongoing third revolution is crumbling people’s 
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faith in sustained economic and social development, which calls into question the 
credibility of the entire political system. Once again, the CCP is facing a looming 
legitimacy crisis that has placed a dark cloud above the heads of the 21
st
 century 
party leaders. 
According to Seymour Martin Lipset, a crisis of legitimacy is in essence a crisis 
of change.
120
 Yuchao Zhu further argues that modernization process inevitably 
creates situations where ruling authority becomes challenged. In order to maintain 
its position, the party must readjust itself and conform to the changing 
surroundings in the society. This can only happen if the CCP is able to relate to 
the concerns of the people and persuade them of its ability to continue to defend 
their common interests – however different they may be.121 With most of the old 
sources running dry, where, then, will the party find new means to succeed in this 
crucial mission? 
Holbig sees the answer in culturalism/ideology and good governance. These two 
complementary features can balance the innate instability of the performance-
based legitimacy model without actually deviating too far from the reform era 
tradition.
122
 When examined within the theoretical framework of this study, this 
updated version of performance still fits Zhao’s Weberian description, but is 
based upon a slightly different view of the world than that of forty or even twenty 
years ago.  
In present-day China, government performance is evaluated by a pluralism of 
norms as opposed to the previous decades’ quite narrow way of understanding 
good quality of life. Shared values, ethics and morality are equally important 
when dealing with the wellbeing of the individual and the society as a whole. 
Also, they have the ability to reduce stress and anxiety caused by rapid social 
transition. This is in particular the case among the less privileged segments of the 
population that otherwise struggle to see the positive outcomes of such 
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processes.
123
 In this context, ideology refers to more than just a set of socialist 
doctrines or tenets. It is closely linked to traditional Chinese culture and its 
appreciation of harmony and people-centric rule.
124
 As Kluver so aptly put it, “- - 
ideology is not just an intellectual abstraction; rather, it is a settled worldview and 
morality.”125  
In the fourth chapter of this study, I will try to examine whether this kind of 
performance-based legitimacy model vol. 2.0 is applicable to the reigns of the two 
most recent CCP leaders. But before that, I will turn my focus to the underlying 
Chinese society and the trend of rising leftist influence that has led some to 
believe that at hands is not just a re-evaluation of the reform era system, but a 
more fundamental change back to Mao-style ideological legitimacy building. 
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3 Bringing Back Ideology 
Since the beginning of the reform era, China has steadily continued on the path of 
deepening marketization process. At the same, however, it has been plagued with 
fierce objection to globalization and the negative side-effects stemming from the 
reforms. Leftist critique slowly emerged in the early 1990’s and continued into the 
21
st
 century.
126
 This initially intellectual movement found fertile soil in popular 
expressions against inequalities and soon expanded into a social phenomenon of 
Maoist nostalgia. After decades of absence, socialist ideology was making a 
strong comeback in Chinese society.  
3.1 Return of the Intellectual Left 
After the reform and opening up policies kicked off in 1978, communist ideology 
was gradually dismissed as unfit to meet the needs of modern times. The old 
Maoist principles of revolution and egalitarianism yielded to the agenda of 
pursuing marketization and economic development under the new CCP motto 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics”.127 In accordance, all voices calling for 
the restoration of the original CCP ideology were suppressed and condemned as 
treacherous. 
It is important to notice that the “Left” is not a unified political movement in 
China. Within it, there are at least two subgroups that greatly differ from each 
other. Ultra-leftists are old liner Maoists that promote a more radical execution of 
Marxist ideas. In this study, the focus is on the so-called New Left, which is a 
much more looser grouping comprised of influential left-wing intellectuals. Even 
though their views and research interest may vary, they do share a common 
understanding of the missteps in China’s modernizing plan. China’s New Leftist 
movement should not be mixed up with the Western 1960’s political movement of 
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the same name. Here, the enemy comes in the form of globalization, privatization 
and capitalism – not conservative gender roles or sexual discrimination. 128 
The New Leftists believe that reform and opening up policies are behind all the 
problems that have come to afflict the modern Chinese society. While the rise in 
material wellbeing is welcomed, it should not be achieved at the cost of social 
safety nets.
129
 At the core of the New Leftist political message is a harsh critique 
of reform era economic policies that have led to serious violations of social 
equality. According to Political Science professors He Li and Chi Zhiyuan, the 
New Left ideology seeks to put economic justice ahead of economic growth and 
wishes to reverse the trend of market-driven reform process in order to tackle the 
root causes of China’s social malaise.130 In other words, they advocate a strong 
state with planned economy, and hope for the swift return of the socialist values of 
the Maoist era.
131
 
Charles W. Freeman and Wen Jin Yuan have done extensive research on the 
composition and influence of the New Leftist movement. They argue that the first 
signs of the resurgence of the New Left coincided with China’s deepening 
integration into global market economy.
 132
 
New Left thinkers remained politically marginalized throughout the 1980’s and 
much of the 1990’s. The CCP leadership had thus far been able to uphold a 
national consensus over the fact that deepening of the reform policies was the only 
way forward for China.  This image was, however, about to crumble into pieces 
with the approach of the new millennium. In 1993, following the opening of the 
price system, it became obvious that China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
could no longer compete with the private sector. As a result, companies were 
forced to undergo difficult restructuring processes. This ended in massive layoffs 
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and deterioration of the Chinese welfare system. The New Leftists saw China’s 
adoption of Western style capitalism as the main reason behind the crisis.
133
 Li 
concludes that an equally important catalyst for the emergence of New Left 
movement was the Asian financial crisis in 1997. This served as a reminder of the 
perils of globalization.
134
 In the eyes of the leftist intellectuals, overt financial 
liberalization and foreign investment would ultimately result in a loss of national 
sovereignty.
135
 The grim fate of China’s neighboring countries was to act as a 
warning for the nation’s political leaders. 
It was not before the early 2000’s that the New Leftist message really began to 
appeal to the general public. By that time, the manifold challenges created by the 
accelerating pace of marketization had already become visible to ordinary 
citizens.  During the time period of 1993-2002, as many as 63 million workers had 
lost their jobs and many more fallen victims of widening income gaps, social 
dislocation, public corruption, environmental degradation and various other 
adverse impacts of rapid economic reforms. A final tie-breaker was the 2008 
Global Economic Crisis.  By revealing the limits of the liberal market system, it 
put an end to the efficiency mantra of the state and ended the carefully preserved 
consensus over the nature of China’s reforms.136  
In terms of traditional media coverage, the New Leftists causes still largely remain 
in the sidelines. However, signs of a much greater influence, in particular among 
Chinese internet users, are already present.
 
The movement has been successful in 
spreading its message through social media platforms and other popular 
networking sites. In its desperate attempt to control any public discourse 
unfavorable to its own agenda, the communist party has put many neo-Maoist 
websites under strict censorship. In 2012, CCP officials closed Utopia.com, a 
flagship website of the New Left, due to its sensitive political content.
137
 
Dealing with the leftist critique is a balancing act between preserving party image 
and opposing to competing claims for authority. The New Left is not a traditional 
                                                 
133
 Freeman – Yuan, 65, 67. 
134
 Li, 5. 
135
 Saich, 254. 
136
 Freeman – Yuan, 65, 67. 
137
 Branigan, Tania (2012): China shuts down Maoist website Utopia. The Guardian 6.4.2012. 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/06/china-maoist-website-utopia> Last retrieved 
10.9.2014. 
 35 
 
adversary of the party in the sense that it does not demand democracy or a total 
renewal of the Chinese political system. On the contrary, these people act as the 
defenders of CCP’s original Maoist legacy. This makes it impossible to simply 
reject them as heretics. Wang Hui from Beijing’s Tsinghua University concludes: 
“Ironically, in our constitution, China is a socialist state led by the 
working class. If you use such a slogan, the government must face 
this challenge. If they negate this legacy, without negotiation or 
compromise, they lose legitimacy.”138 
It is a major fear of the party leadership that the already delicate bond between the 
working class and the party would break. If the citizens start to relate with the 
leftists intellectuals, it might result in an increased pressure towards dethroning 
the current CCP leadership. Mao imagery and slogans have already been used in 
anti-government demonstrations led by the displeased workers.
139
  
3.2 Popular Expressions of Neo-Maoism 
One possible way of examining the return of the Left is to position it as part of a 
more widespread development. The rise of populism is a universal phenomenon 
affecting almost all established regimes in the world. Daniele Albertazzi and 
Duncan McDonnell point out that while the term is often associated with extreme 
Right, it is by no means restricted to solely one end of the political spectrum. As 
upholders of conservative values, populist movements can just as easily relate 
with leftist doctrines. According to their definition, populism is best understood 
as: 
“An ideology which pits a virtuous and homogenous people against 
a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as 
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depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their 
rights, values, prosperity , identity and voice.” 140 
This has been the case in China, where populist rebellion against globalization, 
corruption and the established system have taken influences from the New Leftist 
critique and combined it with a peculiar wave of nostalgia for the late Chairman 
Mao and his teachings. 
3.2.1 Symbol of rebellion and nostalgia 
The pace of marketization has accelerated significantly during the past decade or 
two. In the 1980’s, popular dissatisfaction burst out as a cry for more political 
reforms, freedom and democracy. In recent years, the same frustration has more 
often been targeted towards the reform process itself.
141
  
This can be explained by turning our attention to the losers of the development 
process. Almost always the burden of social inequality and injustice has fallen on 
the shoulders of peasants and blue-collar workers – the two groups that used to 
make up the very core of the original CCP support base. A survey made in 
Ningxia, one of the poorest provinces in China, showed that nearly 80 per cent of 
the respondents no longer had close emotional ties to the communist party. In 
addition, half of them doubted the party’s ability to defend the interests of the 
working class.
142
 A huge number of people have been forced to relocate in hopes 
for better livelihood. This has resulted in severe social security problems as most 
of the migrant workers are not eligible for the same benefits as the local residents. 
The losing side no longer submissively settles for its worsened circumstances 
while the richest one per cent of the nation keeps on accumulating more wealth. 
Instead, it is becoming more and more outspoken. As stated earlier, the number of 
uprisings is in a steep rise all across the country. Of special interest here is the 
trend of linking Mao and his ideological heritage with the protestors’ claims. In 
2002, approximately 30,000 SOE workers took the streets of Liaoning together 
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with massive portraits of the late Chairman. With this move, they wanted to point 
out how the special relationship between proletarian class and the party was no 
longer mutually honored.
143
 One protester recalls the event: 
“There were people singing ‘the Internationale’: an elderly woman 
worker cried out lamenting that ‘Chairman Mao should not have 
died so soon!’ - - There was a huge Mao portrait that an elderly 
worker took from his home, a personal collector’s item. We actually 
had a planning meeting before and decided that we should take a 
Mao portrait with us, because we wanted to show the contrast we felt 
between the past and the present.”144 
Zhengzhou 4 is a group of worker activists who in September 2004 distributed a 
leaflet accusing the CCP of abandoning the working class. The flyer was 
distributed on the 28
th
 anniversary of Mao’s death. By calling for a return to the 
socialist path, the activists at the same time denounced the current policy line. 
This of course was not warmly welcomed by the party officials, and expectedly 
led to the arrestment and imprisonment of two of the writers. Despite the strict 
punishment, Zhengzhou 4 received much attention and support for their 
demonstration. Members of the leftist movement travelled to Zhengzhou to show 
solidarity during the trial. Even a petition demanding for their release was 
circulated.
145
  
The sentiment of disappointment and neglect is turning into a political risk for the 
current regime. Leftist criticism towards the party has extended beyond mere 
intellectual debate straight into the public sphere. The people have begun to 
contrast righteous Maoist teachings with the harshness of reform era China.
146
 
Thus, Mao is not just a political figure whose portrait can be carried at mass 
demonstrations, but a collective symbol of nostalgia for the good old days.
 
 
According to Geremie Barmé, old cultural symbols are often revived in times of 
uncertainty. They help to create social cohesion in an otherwise intimidating 
                                                 
143
 Cheek, Timothy (2008): The Multiple Maos of Contemporary China. Harvard Asia Quarterly, 
Vol. 11, Issue 2, Spring/Summer, 18-19. 
144
 Ibid. 
145
 Weil, 27-28. 
146
 Weil, 27-29. 
 38 
 
situation. With this regard, Mao can be seen as the personification of the early 
years of the PRC when ideals of economic and social equality were still put before 
all others. Since that time, the promise of full employment and social security has 
been turned upside down. Amidst these modern challenges, a sense of assurity 
provided by the iron rice bowl is deeply missed by many.
147
 Among them is this 
retired middle-ranking official from Beijing: 
“I earned less than 100 yuan a month [US$14 at today's exchange 
rates] in Mao's time. I could barely save each month but I never 
worried about anything. My work unit would take care of everything 
for me: housing, medical care, retirement and my children's 
education, though there were no luxuries. If I had some problem, I 
could always turn to my work unit for help. Now I receive 3,000 
yuan as a [monthly] pension, but I have to count every penny - 
everything is so expensive and no one will take care of me now if I 
fall ill.”148 
The appeal of Chairman Mao manifests itself in various ways. Not only a 
vanguard of the working class or a symbol of self-worth that got lost somewhere 
along the way, he is interestingly also perceived as a god-like creature watching 
over the people.
149
 According to a survey conducted in 40 major Chinese cities in 
2008, more than 11 per cent of families had a dedicated Mao shrine in their 
homes. In comparison, the number of memorial tablets for ancestors was higher 
by only one per cent.
150
  
The image of an enigmatic national hero is further reinforced through a number of 
popular stories and legends. One of them is the anecdote about the former 
President and CCP leader Jiang Zemin in 1993. The year marked the 100
th
 
birthday of Chairman Mao and was celebrated with the inauguration of his statue. 
Jiang was given the honor of revealing this impressive work of art. The word is 
that despite several attempts, he somehow was not able to remove the silk cover. 
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Only after saluting the statue by bowing three times in front of it, did he succeed 
in his mission.
151
 
For the younger urban generation, Mao Zedong represents a sort of pop icon that 
signals more youth rebelliousness than adherence to a particular tenet or state-
building theory. While Mao still is a politically safe choice of idolization, he 
nevertheless evokes strong feelings in authorities. Born long after the death of 
Mao, these youngsters do not have first-hand experience of what life was like 
during the height of Mao’s rule – especially the devastating years of the Cultural 
Revolution. A “cool Mao brand” is an essential part of Chinese street culture and 
openly displayed in graffiti or street markets where one hardly can avoid running 
into fake copies of the Little Red Book or commodity items depicting the image 
and teachings of the Chairman.
 152
 
This public revival of China’s socialist past is re-shaping the relationship between 
society and politics in unprecedentedly powerful ways. While Mao’s legacy helps 
to legitimize the ruling base of the party, it can also act as a critical point of 
comparison. This threat became reality in the city of Chongqing, where an 
aspiring high-rank CCP politician began to couple leftist policies together with 
Maoist nostalgia. 
3.2.2 The case of Chongqing  
Chongqing is a southwestern Chinese megacity, whose rural population (70 per 
cent of all citizens) and location in the inland has earned the city the nickname of 
“microcosm of China”. With difficult socio-economic challenges and widespread 
corruption in both public and private sectors, Chongqing is often viewed as the 
case study of all the undesirable side effects that China’s rapid integration to 
global market economy has come to entail. Combined with a strong working class 
presence stemming from the city’s history as a wartime capital and a major 
military industrial base, it is no wonder that the troubled situation has created 
anxiety even in the central government.
153
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After the initial hit of the 2008 Global Economic Crisis, the Chinese government 
decided to give more leeway for experiments at regional level. In its efforts to 
underline a new, less profit-driven approach, the CCP blessed the adoption of a 
unique development program that put emphasis on public sector and social 
welfare. The set of economic and social policies led by the ambitious and very 
charismatic Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai has since been dubbed as the 
“Chongqing Model”.154  
The main feature of this model was the Five Chongqing program, which included 
initiatives to secure affordable housing, public transportation, health care, 
pollution-free natural environment and safety for all citizens.
155
 Rising property 
prices had created a severe housing problem for low-income families. Bo pledged 
to regulate the housing market so that the real estate prices would come down and 
provide the city’s growing migrant population with sufficient low-cost rental 
supply.  By radically expanding the transportation network, his aim was to make 
the city the most important transport hub of the region. The target of promoting 
health insurance and basic medical services was supported by a whopping 35 
billion yuan ($5.7 billion) investment. Afforestation scheme and efforts to 
increase the citizens’ sense of security were met with an official praise from the 
central government.
156
  
The common thread running through Bo’s policies was the concept of “common 
prosperity” – an idea that has New Leftist influences all over it. In a speech in 
2011, Bo made the following comment: 
“The Western culture from the British bourgeois revolution in 1640 
has had a history of more than 370 years. They often championed the 
slogans of ‘freedom, democracy, equality, and fraternity’. However, 
they have never mentioned ‘common prosperity’ – a topic that 
concerns the vast majority of humanity. Only the communists, with 
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their down-to-earth materialist courage and selfless spirit, write 
‘common prosperity’ on their own flag.”157 
The idea of common prosperity presented itself in the enlarged role of the state. At 
the local level, state investment firms overtook the job of private capital and 
turned thousands of old SOEs into profitable businesses. The city also welcomed 
more than three million rural migrants and granted them with rights to pensions, 
public rental housing, children’s education, and other social benefits previously 
restricted to only registered urban residents. In 2009, Chongqing allocated more 
than 50 percent of its expenditures to public welfare.
158
  
When compared with the post-Tiananmen tradition of intensified economic 
reforms, the Chongqing Model seems to mark a fundamental break away from the 
official CCP line. However, when measured against the changing political 
environment of the 21
st
 century China, the model no longer strikes quite as 
unusual.
159
 Thus, what really invoked the general interest in the Chongqing case 
were not so much the policies themselves, but the populist moves and neo-Maoist 
rhetoric that came along with them.  
As an aspiring Politburo Standing Committee member, Bo was especially keen to 
re-establish the close ideological ties between the masses and the party cadres. 
The reform and opening up period had made the cadres elitist and increasingly out 
of touch with the everyday challenges of the people. Bo wished to reverse this by 
re-invoking the Maoist principle of mass line. Each year he made all the party 
members spend a dedicated amount of time in rural areas, learning from the 
masses and living among them. Each cadre was also pointed to one household 
with economic difficulties that he was obliged to help and care for.
160
 Another 
aspect of this populist moral revival was the massive crackdown on corruption 
and organized crime called “Striking Black”. During the campaign, thousands of 
millionaires, local officials, police officers and gangsters were convicted and 
imprisoned.
161
 The restoration of law and order was widely credited by the locals, 
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even though harsh punishment methods and even alleged cases of torture and 
other unlawful methods were reported.
162
   
If the return of mass line and the rigorous Striking Black symbol the ideological 
hard core of the Chongqing Model, “Red Culture” campaign resembles a softer 
kind of approach. According to Bo, the reform years did not only change the 
social and economic status of the Chinese people, but at the same time also left a 
lasting impact on the society’s shared values. The Red Culture campaign aimed to 
consolidate the original socialist core values and public morality of the people by 
bringing back revolutionary songs, classic novels and uplifting stories. Bo himself 
took the leader’s role in this Maoist nostalgia trip.163 He did not hide his 
disrespect for the prevalence of Western values in Chinese society: 
“- - In the eyes of some people, ‘going forward’ means learning from 
the West, while inheriting and promoting the CCP’s fine traditions 
are regarded as being ‘leftist’, going ‘backward’. These remarks are 
truly odd and strange.”164 
The local party leadership started the campaign by sending inspiring Mao quotes 
by text messages to the city’s mobile phone users and by hosting various “red 
song” competitions.165 All citizens were told to learn by heart a list of 36 
revolutionary songs
166
 – a task which the local media was harnessed to supervise. 
Chongqing satellite TV station took the mission very seriously and decided to 
replace all Western influenced prime time shows with Chinese revolutionary 
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dramas and musicals. Soon after, it also put a stop to all commercial 
advertising.
167
  
The high-point of the Red Culture campaign was reached in June 2011, just weeks 
ahead of the 90
th
 anniversary of the CCP, when a massive delegation from 
Chongqing put on seven Singing Red shows in Beijing.
168
 At home front, the Mao 
frenzy culminated in a huge sing-along event at the Chongqing Olympic center, 
where more than 100,000 people from across the country gathered together to sing 
the most beloved revolutionary classics.
169
 
The immense popularity of Bo’s Red Culture campaign can partly be explained by 
the same feelings of insecurity and frustration that have given rise to the many 
outbursts of civil unrest. Animosity towards the zeitgeist of today has created an 
open space for neo-Maoist populism with promises of social justice and a renewed 
sense of belonging. While the promotion Maoist doctrine and the ideological 
heritage of the early CCP may to some extent have worked in favor of the party, it 
also carried with it a dangerous threat of a revolution from below. People were 
suddenly given an acceptable way of openly contesting the official policy line of 
the past decades.
170
  
However, when examined more closely, Bo’s campaigns seem to have more to do 
with gaining people’s trust and political support than reviving original CCP 
legitimacy. Some even saw the Chongqing Model as Bo’s way of challenging the 
central leadership and securing his own career advancements.
171
 For example, the 
ideological base of the Striking Black campaign has been questioned by some of 
the convicted who believe that it served only as a cover up to oust out Bo’s 
personal enemies and make private businesses more amenable to his economic 
policies.
172
 It is also worth noticing that most of the hailed red songs actually were 
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not that red to begin with. Instead of praising revolution, they oftentimes 
celebrated China’s national achievements and even modern day athletes, such as 
the young NBA star Yao Ming. Likewise, text messages with Mao quotations 
were sent to evoke feelings of fatherly care and encouragement – not feverish 
class struggle among fellow citizens. A leading official behind the Red Culture 
movement confirmed that the phenomenon had been incorrectly linked with 
socialist revolution and ideology alone. He wanted to remind that in China, the 
color red also carries important reference to happiness and harmony.
173
  
Whatever the motives behind the Chongqing case were, it nevertheless burst the 
discussion about the future of the CCP and its legitimacy into full flames. 
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4 The Rhetoric of 21st Century CCP Leaders 
The communist party has thus far managed to adapt into changing circumstances; 
during critical periods of transition, it has been able to successfully modify the 
ways in which its legitimacy has been evaluated.
174
 The advent of the so-called 
third revolution has evoked a timely discussion about yet another significant shift 
in CCP legitimacy strategies. 
By focusing on the politics and rhetoric of both Hu Jintao (2002-2012) and Xi 
Jinping (2012- ), the goal here is to determine the extent to which rising popular 
contest and the public phenomenon of neo-Maoism has forced the CCP leadership 
to re-think its legitimacy basis and seek new sources of power justification. The 
main question is, whether the new generation of CCP leaders still fits the 
theoretical framework of performance-based legitimacy or if it has come to mark 
a peculiar leap back in time. In this study I have chosen to apply Holbig’s updated 
description of performance, where economic growth, nationalism and social 
stability are complemented with additional sources of culturalism/ideology and 
good governance.
175
 To be clear, ideology in this context refers to a set of 
culturally accepted values and morality concepts rather than adherence to 
orthodox socialism per se, as was more or less the case with the CCP’s original 
legitimation tradition.  
In determining the relevance of this theory, it is helpful to look into the shared 
values and premises that influence the ways in which the party justifies its 
position and defines its relation with the surrounding society.  
4.1 Harmonious Hu Jintao 
Hu Jintao was appointed the General-Secretary of the CCP in November 2002. 
During the reign of his predecessor, China’s integration to global market economy 
had reached new heights. It all culminated in the ratification of China’s WTO 
accession in 2001. While successful in economic terms, the growth-oriented 
development plan did not take into notice the worsening situation of social 
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inequality and disintegration. Hu’s ascension to power was therefore greeted with 
high hopes for more open and balanced rule.
176
  
Hu’s early years in the saddle did indeed witness a renewed interest for the 
people’s wellbeing and their concerns. However, what was surprising for many, 
he soon began to couple them with long lost elements of Maoist rhetoric and 
policies. This stood in sharp contrast with the customary reform era tradition. 
4.1.1 16th Party Congress - Discursive turn to the left 
Official power transitions within the CCP take place at Party Congresses held 
every five years. An unwritten rule is that each party leader serves two subsequent 
terms.  The 16
th
 NPC in November 2002 marked the end of Jiang Zemin’s second 
term and the coming of power of his successor, Hu Jintao.  
Hu took the lead in a situation where faith in sustained economic and social 
development had already begun to falter. People were increasingly frustrated with 
the unequal division of wealth as well as with the numerous other unwanted side-
effects of the rapid reform process. The beginning of Hu’s first term was further 
complicated by the political legacy of his predecessor that was now incorporated 
into the party statues. Three Represents theory
177
, i.e. the inclusion of business 
and intellectual spheres as well as the great majority of the people into party 
member pool, was the brainchild of Jiang and the ideological culmination point of 
his career. By changing the status of the CCP from the vanguard of the working 
class into a representative of also economic elites, professionals and urban middle 
class, the theory formally acknowledged the party’s departure from its socialist 
roots. This was not an ideal starting point for the new regime hoping to depict 
itself as an advocate of the less advantaged.
 178
 
While Hu could not openly disregard the Three Represents, he did alter its main 
message to better suit his own agenda. He dissociated himself from the original 
content by putting emphasis solely on the latter part of the theory, i.e. 
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“representation of the fundamental interests of the greatest majority of the 
people”. This reinterpretation of Jiang’s theory summarized Hu’s new approach to 
class and society:
179
 
“Building a Party that serves the interests of the public and governs 
for the people, and insisting on appraising our policy decisions on 
the basis of whether the people support them, endorse them, like 
them, and are receptive to them, we will know whether we have a 
firm grip on the fundamental objective of implementing the 
important thinking of the ‘Three Represents’.”180 
People-centrism has since been a recurrent theme in Hu’s political thinking. His 
first public visit was to the old revolutionary village of Xibaipo in late 2002. The 
destination entailed immense symbolic reference. Xibaipo was where the People’s 
Liberation Army was stationed before taking over Beijing to establish the PRC in 
1949. It is also where Mao held his famous speech warning his comrades against 
complacency and stressing the importance of “plain living and arduous struggle”. 
In a speech given later during the tour, Hu repeated the same call from over six 
decades ago. He also emphasized the two “musts” - humble attitude and 
hardworking spirit - that the party should never forget.
181
 The full text of the 
speech was published in all the major newspapers in China.
182
 Long lines of Mao 
quotes left little of the new leader’s ideological stance to imagination. By 
depicting himself as an heir of the socialist revolution, Hu tried to make his 
authority more justifiable in a situation where pleading to further marketization 
efforts was not likely to pay dividends.  
The trend continued in the following year. Professor Willy Lam from the Chinese 
University in Hong Kong made notice how in a speech commemorating the 110
th
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anniversary of Mao’s birth, Hu expectedly praised the old Chairman’s 
accomplishments. What distinguished it from the rest of similar eulogies was the 
fact that Hu chose not to address any of Mao’s “leftist errors” as had been the 
custom for previous leaders.
183
 By turning the listeners’ focus to the positive sides 
alone, Hu attempted to change the way in which Mao and his policies were to be 
publicly remembered. The speech was directed to a wider national audience and 
as such presented a surprisingly one-sided interpretation of history. 
The third plenary session of the 16
th
 NPC in the fall of 2003 was Hu’s first official 
opportunity to outline his political agenda as the new party leader. In addition to a 
work report to the CCP Central Committee, the plenum also approved an epochal 
document called “Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Several Issues in 
Perfecting the Socialist Market Economy”.184  
The ideological contrast between the Congress opening and the third plenary 
session one year later was immense. Whereas the former stressed high technology 
advancements, urbanization, and economic competitiveness, the latter valued a 
more balanced manner of approach. The Central Committee document placed 
both economic and social development as the CCP’s main targets, equaling the 
two in importance. By calling for “comprehensive planning” in key areas of 
society, Hu seemed to signal a totally different take on economic politics.
185
 The 
need to revive at least some kind of egalitarian spirit became the starting point of 
Hu’s argumentation. However, as Joseph Fewsmith points out, all of these key 
areas (urban and rural development, environmental development, domestic 
economy etc.) were also potential sources of severe social disorder.
 186
 Putting 
focus on them would not only help to balance China’s one-sided GDP growth but 
also secure the legitimacy of the CCP rule.  
Even though the document marked a significant change in CCP rhetoric, it at the 
same time consolidated the continuation of marketization process. This was most 
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evident in the case of property rights, which the plenum wanted to further expand 
as a way to encourage the development of the private sector.
187
 This is an 
important observation to make as it so clearly deviates from the alleged left-
leaning policies of the new leadership. 
In political terms, the third plenary session was perhaps even more significant. Hu 
continued to propagate his version of the Three Represents, which he now saw as 
a binding obligation for the party to dedicate itself to the interests of the people 
and govern only their benefit in mind.
188
 Building on this conception, Hu 
introduced his own motto “Three for the People” which he summarized as: 
“The party must exercise its power for the people, have passion for 
the people and seek benefits of the people”.189  
This meant putting people as the starting and ending point of all political 
decisions. Rhetorically it bore striking resemblance to Maoist mass line tradition. 
That being said, Hu’s idea of mass line greatly differed from its original meaning. 
While Mao actively promoted class struggle as a way to ensure justice and 
equality, Hu wanted to fade out the idea of social conflict by using a vague and 
inclusive term “the people”. This was a deliberate choice aimed to preserve unity 
amidst growing tensions, and reflected the CCP’s attempt to find common ground 
between the conflicting interest groups within the Chinese society.
190
 In addition 
to Maoist influences, it also borrowed many elements from the Confucian people-
centric view of good governance.
191
 
Hu’s motto steered the party towards a distinctly more populist path.192 The newly 
appointed leadership wanted to show their dedication by implementing a host of 
different socio-economic projects aimed at enhancing the situation of 
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disadvantaged citizens. Known also as the “Hu-Wen New Deal”, these populist 
policies were strongly associated with Hu Jintao and his Premier Wen Jiabao.  
The abolition of a 2,600-year-old agricultural tax was one of the most salient 
attempts to revive rural development and an important step in the construction of a 
so-called “new countryside”.193 Rapidly growing income gap between the 
different regions in the country gave rise to specific campaigns aimed to 
decelerate the speed of wealth concentration by allocating state funds and 
investment into the most acute national problem zones.
194
 Besides providing 
support for the poorer inland regions, the Hu-Wen New Deal also included 
initiatives to help the legal position of migrant workers, expand the supply of 
basic health care, and to ensure minimum wages as well as affordable housing for 
all citizens.
195
  
All of these signaled a shift of focus in CCP policy principles and their main 
target audiences. It was the less well-off segments of the population that now 
became the focal point of the new leadership. Chinese social politics have always 
been regulated by a multitude of overlapping and often conflicting interests 
between the different social groups. Until the reform period, socialist ideology had 
largely accounted for keeping together a social safety net of family members, 
neighbors and work units. With the advent of globalization, such a system no 
longer fulfilled the needs of the working people forced to relocate in hopes for 
employment and livelihood. The launching of a state-centered social welfare 
system can thus also be seen as a reaction to the rising phenomenon of 
rootlessness and social instability caused by the deepening structural change.
196
  
Reinforced state involvement in the form of newly established welfare policies did 
to some extent succeed in stabilizing the tensions within the society. However, at 
the same time, they added fuel to the fire of overt leftist populism, such as Bo 
Xilai’s neo-Maoist crusade in Chongqing. By changing the official rhetoric, Hu 
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involuntarily created an open space for questioning the legitimacy of the reform 
era CCP.
197
  
The year 2004 came to mark a personal milestone in Hu’s political career. His 
own theoretical concept “Scientific Outlook on Development” was first introduced 
to the public in January. At that time it was still vaguely described as a model of 
“comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable development” but would soon come 
to define the fundamental ideology behind the new leadership. Holbig interprets 
the prefix “scientific” as referring to the CCP’s innovativeness and competence to 
deal with the complex challenges of the 21
st
 century. The party had during its 
existence always held exclusive rights to truth and state power. This authority 
would not be shaken even amidst the quickening pace of change. The idea of 
coordinated and comprehensive development included a subtle reference to pre-
reform years of planned economy. With this theory, the party wished to reinforce 
an image of itself as the only guarantor of both economic and social justice. It also 
hoped to relate with the culturally embedded ideal of a benevolent ruler who 
would always strive to fulfill the needs of its subjects.
198
  
Hu’s second main concept, “Harmonious Society”, saw daylight at the fourth 
plenary session of the 16
th
 NPC in September the same year.
 
According to Hu, 
socialist harmonious society was a system based on values such as “democracy 
and rule of law, justice and equality, trust and truthfulness, amity and vitality, 
order and stability, and a harmonious relation with nature”. The concept indirectly 
acknowledged the deep social conflicts currently present in Chinese society by 
promising to “adequately mediate among the interest relationships of various 
sectors, and to correctly handle inner contradictions within the people”199. The 
concept was built on widely shared and age-old cultural values that made it easier 
for Hu to gain the trust of the audience. The quest for harmonious co-existence 
and stability had distinct Confucian resonance but also acted as a convenient 
rhetorical weapon to defend the one-party rule. Holbig sees Harmonious society 
as a good example of the CCP’s new strategic mode of governance that combines 
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elements of Confucian tradition with Maoist doctrines. Leaders’ focus on social 
and economic woes strengthens their ruling mandate while the condemnation of 
civil protestation and resistance forestalls the rise of strong opposition 
movements.
 200
   
Fragile legitimacy of the party was the main theme of the fourth plenary session. 
In addition to the concept of Harmonious society, it endorsed a 36-page 
“Resolution on Strengthening the Construction of the Party’s Governing 
Capacity”. The document was not officially published, but state-owned 
newspapers were encouraged to report its content extensively. China Daily quoted 
its value as nothing less than: 
“ - - a major strategic subject with a bearing on the success of 
China's socialist cause, the future and destiny of the Chinese nation, 
the life and death of the Party, as well as the lasting stability and 
prosperity of the country.”201 
This kind of apocalyptic rhetoric matched the increasing anxiety felt among 
members of the party elite. CCP’s ruling status was no longer viewed as self-
evident, but rather something quite the opposite. The paper acknowledged that 
“the party’s governing status is not congenital, nor is it something settled once and 
for all”. 202 Suddenly it was realized that the party would not survive unless 
measures to safeguard its mandate were taken. These included the upholding of 
the Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought and the socialist cause. However, the 
document also made clear that economic reform would continue to be a “top 
priority in governing the country and rejuvenating the nation”.203 Instead of any 
real democratic experiments, Hu put his faith in limited administrative reforms 
within the existing system. Efforts to combat bureaucratic corruption in a top-
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down fashion were believed to be sufficient remedies in addressing the threat to 
CCP’s perennial rule.204  
The resolution marked the beginning of the most massive and systematic leftist 
rectification campaign since the early 1980’s. In order to “preserve the advanced 
nature” of the cadres, altogether 70 million party members were expected to prove 
their loyalty by brushing up their knowledge of socialist party theory. Soon after, 
the CCP founded a separate Academy of Marxism to conduct studies on modern 
versions of Marxist theory.
205
 Even the most critical outside observers could no 
longer dismiss Hu’s ideological awakening as mere populism. 
In an alleged speech to the fourth plenum, Hu also made concerning remarks of 
the dangers of “bourgeois liberalization” that in his opinion was spreading 
uncontrollably in the Chinese society. The harsh rhetoric attacking both domestic 
and foreign adversaries was shocking to many. According to Tony Saich, Hu had 
pointed the finger at those demanding for political reforms and given credit to 
countries like Cuba and North Korea for their successful efforts in maintaining 
control over the public.
206
 This nervous fit was a prelude to a more profound clash 
against Western culture during Hu’s second term in office. 
The building of harmonious society was officially set as a top agenda in February 
2005. At a high-level party seminar Hu gave a keynote speech to provincial and 
ministerial level leaders in which he analyzed the full meaning of the concept. As 
reported by China Daily, he had stressed the importance of avoiding open 
conflicts between the different social groups and guaranteeing safe and stable 
living surroundings for all citizens.
207
 Hu had further linked party legitimacy 
closely together with the harmonious socialist society by stating that it was 
“essential for consolidating the party’s social foundation to govern and achieving 
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the party’s historical governing mission”.208 The audience consisted mainly of 
party cadres already committed to the common political cause. Yet, Hu saw it 
necessary to make recurrent references to the importance of stability and non-
conflicting social order. This perhaps was a clue of possible internal divisions and 
power struggles that were beginning to take place at the top of the party pyramid.  
The call for harmony appears somewhat ironic when juxtaposed with the 
intensified control over civil society. The establishment of a Bureau of Public 
Opinion in the previous year was the first demonstration of the darker side of Hu’s 
people-centric rule. The bureau was set to work under the Central Propaganda 
Department and conduct research on public opinion to tip-off authorities about 
possible grievances before their escalation into full scale riots.
209
 Political 
dissidents, human rights activist and foreign journalists were the first victims of 
Hu’s intensified censorship as crackdowns on Internet became an everyday 
phenomenon. These kind of restrictive policies were much easier to introduce 
when justified with the overriding importance of maintaining social harmony and 
stability.  
China’s economic reforms were the center of attention at the fifth plenary session 
of the Central Committee in the fall of 2005. In addition to political issues, the 
plenum focused on processing the 11
th
 Five-Year Programme (FYP) which would 
act as a roadmap for the country’s economic development.210 In authoritarian 
political systems, such as in China, FYPs continue to be of crucial importance. 
These blueprints indicate the leadership’s stance on reform policies and reveal 
much of their overall development philosophies. The 11
th
 FYP was revolutionary 
in the sense that it placed the idea of common prosperity above the principle of 
continuous economic growth. This was a significant change. Maintaining high 
GDP rates had been the main target of CCP economic planning since the 
beginning of the reform and opening up period in 1978.
211
 While the document 
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still set economic development as its main target, it at the same time 
acknowledged that economic development did not always equal economic growth. 
Instead, development was understood within a larger context where long-term 
achievements outweighed short-term wins.
212
  
This renewed emphasis on sustainability reflected Hu’s attempts to 
counterbalance the phenomenon of widespread social discontent. By promising to 
bridge the income gap between the rich and the poor, and by allocating more 
funds to regional development, the regime hoped to send a strong message of 
commitment and empathy. Even the change of title from “plan” to “programme” 
has been seen as an attempt to underscore the departure from earlier reform era 
economic policies.
213
  
The CCP celebrated its 85
th
 anniversary in June 2006. When addressing the 
attendants of the grand ceremony, Hu made constant references to the party’s 
revolutionary history and its legitimizing effect: 
“Only our Party can become the nucleus of power to lead the 
Chinese revolution, construction, and reform, only it is able to bear 
the great trust of the Chinese people and the Chinese nationality.”214 
In addition to ideological justification, Hu also sought approval from the party’s 
status as a vanguard of the great majority of the Chinese people. He emphasized 
that securing of the CCP rule was a precondition for all further progress and the 
realization of traditional cultural values of harmony and stability: 
“But in order to have stable development and to take China towards 
‘a harmonious society and scientific development’, and to constrict 
‘the new socialist countryside’ it is necessary to take the CCP as 
representing the best interest of the people, the repository of their 
collective modernist hopes and aspirations.”215 
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At the sixth plenary session a couple of months later, Hu further argued that a 
“sound system provides the fundamental guarantee to social equity and justice” 
and that “CCP's efforts in improving governance capacity and maintaining 
advanced nature are the political guarantee for the construction of a harmonious 
socialist society”.216  
The same plenum adopted a resolution on harmonious society that brought 
together all the main elements of Hu’s political themes.217 The official rhetoric 
gave credit to Jiang and his political legacy by affirming the central position of 
economic advances, while still wholeheartedly pushing forward the concept of 
socially balanced growth. Among the set policy targets were attempts to tackle 
issues such as wealth disparity, environmental degradation, deficiencies in rural 
health care and education as well as in social security system. Interestingly, the 
resolution also called for the establishment of new kinds of feedback channels to 
ensure that the voice of the people would be better heard.
218
 Again, the plea for 
extended CCP legitimacy was mostly directed towards the masses – lower and 
middle class people feeling betrayed by the reform politics. 
Improvements in grassroots level participation was another area where Hu 
decided to follow in Mao’s footsteps. However, it seems that Hu’s plan was to 
strengthen the party’s legitimacy from within, without ever losing control to the 
masses. Mao, on the other hand, was a believer of “big democracy”, allowing 
even non-party members to participate in political debate.
219
 In a way, Hu’s 
attempt to revive local democracy can be seen as a way to prevent possible 
demands for greater public influence.  
In addition to consolidating his own political agenda, Hu seized the moment to 
polish the party’s public image. Leftist movements and intellectuals had long been 
accusing the CCP of abandoning its ideological origin. This criticism had found 
fertile soil in discontent citizens that missed the simple years of socialist rule. In 
response to their outcry, Hu had introduced a concept of “socialist core value 
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system” that would put an end to China’s current “moral vacuum”. As Saich 
states, the leadership was determined to not give away the party’s morally 
supreme position.
220
 Public promotion of socialist ideology and ethical principles 
would make the regime more legitimate in the eyes of their critics and also help to 
reinforce the narrative of undisturbed harmony: 
“- - socialist core value system is the essential element of the culture 
of harmony. We must adhere to the guiding role of Marxism in 
ideological fields, firmly control the development direction of 
socialist advanced culture, advocate harmony concepts and nurture 
the spirit of harmony to further foster common ideals and beliefs for 
the whole society and solidify the ideological and moral base for the 
whole Party and people of various ethnic groups to work hard in 
unison.”221 
The application of the concept had already been tested with the launching of a list 
called “Eight Honors and Disgraces” earlier the same year. The listing included a 
combination of moral instructions that entailed reference not only to Maoism and 
traditional Confucian values, but also to Hu’s people-centered policies: 
1. Love the country; do it no harm 
2. Serve the people; never betray them 
3. Follow science; discard superstition 
4. Be diligent; not indolent 
5. Be united, help each other; make no gains at other's expense 
6. Be honest and trustworthy; do not sacrifice ethics for profit 
7. Be disciplined and law-abiding; not chaotic and lawless 
8. Live plainly, work hard; do not wallow in luxuries and 
pleasures.
222
 
Such campaigns had been prevalent in CCP history before, often coinciding with 
periods of legitimacy crises. This time was no exception. By showing the people 
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the difference between right and wrong behavior, the party hoped to preempt the 
expansion of social contradictions.
223
 Yet, here, the commonly shared premises 
and values derived not so much from Maoist thought as from Confucian concepts 
of stability and harmony among the people. All possible ways of rocking the boat 
were deemed immoral whereas obedience and modesty represented just the kinds 
of personality traits worth pursuing of.  
Despite the large-scale utilization of China’s traditional culture, it is safe to say 
that Hu Jintao’s first tenure was plagued with strong leftist influences. These five 
years witnessed the creation of his two main theoretical slogans – Scientific 
Outlook on Development and Harmonious Society – both of which strongly relied 
on Maoist traditions of mass line and increased state involvement.  If the first half 
of Hu’s reign did indeed signal a step away from the reform era performance-
based legitimacy model, his second term in office painted a more comprehensive 
picture of the CCP’s ideological turnaround.   
4.1.2 17th Party Congress - “Stability is a blessing and chaos is a 
calamity” 
Hu was re-appointed as the Party General-Secretary at the opening session of the 
17
th
 Party Congress in October 2007.  The Congress was an important milestone 
for the established leadership, whose main political slogans were now 
incorporated into the party constitution. The revised party canon described 
Scientific Outlook on Development as “an important guiding principle for China's 
economic and social development” and “a major strategic thought”, elevating it to 
the same level with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping 
Theory and Jiang’s theory of Three Represents.224 Similarly, the constitution also 
ratified the pursue of harmonious society: 
“The Communist Party of China leads the people in building a 
harmonious socialist society - - the Party focuses its efforts on 
improving people's lives by solving the most specific problems of 
the utmost and immediate concern to the people and strives to create 
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a situation in which all people do their best, find their proper places 
in society and live together in harmony.”225 
This was an exceptional achievement. Hu was only half way through his tenure 
and already given the status of an elderly statesman.
226
 This was also the first time 
in party history when popular discourses, not just theories, were adopted as part of 
the official doctrine.
227
   
The Congress keynote speech gave a taste of the coming five years. By stripping 
off the most conspicuous left-wing courting, Hu revealed the true essence of his 
political thinking. He continued to promote balanced growth and set the target of 
creating a “comprehensively well-off society” by the year 2020, but at the same 
time indicated adherence to the reform program: 
“The orientation and path of reform and opening up are entirely 
correct, and their merits and achievements can never be negated. To 
stop or reverse reform and opening up would only lead to a blind 
alley.”228 
This clearly was one the main messages Hu wanted to convey. As Kerry Brown, 
Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney, notes, an entire section 
of the 10-page long report was dedicated to the historic 1978 Party Congress 
meeting and its decisions. In Hu’s argumentation these not only gave rise to 
greater affluence, but also represented the only viable alternative for the 
modernizing nation.
229
 Suddenly, premises in CCP argumentation were derived 
not from the egalitarian Maoist era but from the fruits of the reform policies. The 
purpose of this move was to rein in overly enthusiastic leftist radicals both within 
and outside of the party. Hu went on to vow further improvements in China’s 
economic development and linked them together with the future legitimacy of the 
CCP: 
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“Taking economic development as the central task is vital to 
invigorating our nation and is the fundamental requirement for the 
robust growth and lasting stability of the Party and the nation.”230 
Economic achievements and national invigoration were not the only arguments 
behind the claim for prolonged one-party rule. While Maoist thought did not 
receive as much attention as it had during Hu’s first term, ideology continued to 
dominate the officially accepted value pool. Hu promoted the development of 
socialist culture as building material for national cohesion and part of China’s 
international soft power scheme.
231
  
In the latter part of his speech, Hu responded to the calls for more extensive 
political reforms. Saich pays special attention to how administrative 
improvements and the implementation of democratic rule were given a noticeable 
primacy but no concrete examples of their practical application were being 
offered.
232
 Instead, Hu settled for praising inner-party democracy and anti-
corruption initiatives as the “lifeblood” of the party.233 This loose goal setting 
acted as a premise upon which further argumentation of the virtuousness of the 
leadership could be based. Saich further concludes that the conception of a more 
efficient and cleaner government was hoped to give the regime just enough credit 
to regain its position in the eyes of the frustrated citizens. The underlying 
principle behind Hu’s vision was at all times safeguarding the CCP legitimacy, 
and on no occasion were these measures meant to compromise the party’s 
supreme authority:
234
 
“We must uphold the Party's role as the core of leadership in 
directing the overall situation and coordinating the efforts of all 
quarters, and improve its capacity for scientific, democratic and law-
based governance to ensure that the Party leads the people in 
effectively governing the country.”235 
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The image of a genuine socialist, eager to revive the spirit of mass line, gradually 
began to fade. Behind the façade of neo-Maoist rhetoric was a populist leader 
hoping to establish his rule and stabilize the increasingly volatile society. Hu’s 
second term witnessed the emergence of iron fist politics with strict adherence to 
rules, authority and status quo. Report to the 17
th
 NPC was the first, but definitely 
not the last sign of a renewed political trajectory.  
In the following year, Hu gave a speech commemorating the 30
th
 anniversary of 
reform and opening up policies. He forcibly stressed that Marxism could act as a 
guiding principle only if modified to meet the needs of current conditions and 
trends.
236
 Brown writes how Hu had even accused “leftist enemies” of trying to 
set barriers to China’s modernization process.237 With these words, the incumbent 
party chief wanted to further highlight the correctness of economic reforms and 
cast a shadow over the unbelievers. Yet, it was clear that the target audience here 
was not only those directly accused. From the perspective of the CCP, all forms of 
social radicalization greatly hampered the common cause of development: 
“At a time when far-reaching and profound changes are taking place 
in China and beyond, we should always maintain social stability. - - 
we are deeply aware that development is the fundamental principle 
and stability is the fundamental goal. Without stability, we will get 
nowhere and may even fritter away our past achievements.”238 
Hu reminded listeners of Deng Xiaoping’s “Four Cardinal Principles” that were 
not to be questioned under any circumstances.
239
 These included keeping to the 
socialist road, upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the 
Communist Party, and the Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.
240
 Of 
special importance was the third principle of unshaken party control. In exchange 
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for a strong mandate, the leadership promised to protect the people from outside 
threats and the infiltration of damaging international values.
241
 
The fear of unwanted outside influence and disorder spreading beyond the grasps 
of the party was not entirely without foundation. In 2008, China officially boosted 
the world’s largest netizen population with more than 221 million Internet 
users.
242
 Along with the swarms of gamers and other entertainment users, Internet 
has enabled the active operation of many pro-democracy movements. As Lauri 
Paltemaa argues, new generations of online activists do not necessarily respond to 
old punishment mechanisms. Even after the exile of their central figures, these 
organizations continue to communicate their messages into mainland China. One 
of the most prominent examples of such action was the propagation of “Charter 
08”.243  
Charter 08 was an online petition marking the 60
th
 anniversary of UN Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. It included a list of 19 principles and objectives that 
would help turn China from an authoritarian one-party system into a federal 
democracy abiding by internationally acknowledged human rights standards. The 
petition quickly received several hundreds of signatories from all walks of life. 
Initially the campaign was led mostly by intellectuals and dissidents, but soon 
expanded into a small-scale internet sensation. Even ordinary citizens and 
members of the urban middle class, who, up until then, had been the most loyal 
proponents of CCP politics, chose to align with the opposition.
244
  
Challenges to the established regime did not only manifest themselves in the form 
of online protestation. In March 2008, tensions in Tibet heightened to a point of 
no return. As series of anti-government riots in Lhasa expanded into a regional 
uprising, Hu’s rhetoric of harmony was put into a real test. The crisis erupted 
when a couple of hundred monks marched into the city as a way to pay tribute to 
the 1959 revolt and the subsequent exile of Dalai Lama. They were carrying 
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Tibetan national flags – something that had not been done in almost 20 years – 
and shouted out demands for freedom and independence. In addition to frustration 
over the stalled negotiations on autonomy, the monks wanted to express their 
concern for the preservation of Tibetan culture and religion amidst increasing 
pressures of Han Chinese assimilation policies.
245
 Security police managed to stop 
their march but, soon after, similar demonstrations sprouted up around the region. 
The authorities reacted to the escalated situation with violent counter-attacks, 
resulting in the deaths of approximately 200 civilians.
246
 Party propaganda 
immediately labeled the protesters as terrorists “more catastrophic than bin 
Laden”247 and declared a “people’s war” against such separatist attempts 
compromising China’s national unity.248  
Just one year later, the CCP leaders were again faced with regional rebellion in the 
Muslim province of Xinjiang. What initially started out as a peaceful protest 
against ethnic discrimination suddenly turned into a bloody clash between Han 
Chinese and native Uighurs. More than 1,400 people were arrested, with death 
sentences imposed on those claimed to have connections with Central Asian 
terrorist organizations.
249
 Although Tibet and Xinjiang represent two very extreme 
cases of social fragmentation, CCP’s response to the uprisings aptly reflected the 
harshening tone of Hu’s reign. 
The run-up to 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics was a time of fierce patriotic 
propaganda. No negative news of Olympic-related issues was allowed to be 
published. Instead, journalists were instructed to focus on touching and uplifting 
stories to nurture social cohesion and national pride. Anne-Marie Brady believes 
that this “campaign of mass distraction” successfully shifted the general focus 
                                                 
245
 Smith, Warren S. (2008): Tibet’s Last Stand? The American Interest, 1.7.2008. 
<http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2008/07/01/tibets-last-stand/> Last retrieved 
3.10.2014. 
246
 Bonnin, Michel (2009): Far from Harmonious: The Chinese Authorities’ Handling of the 2008 
Tibet Crisis. China Perspectives, Issue 3, 69. 
<http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/4847> Last retrieved 3.10.2014. 
247
 Smith. 
248
 Lam, Willy (2008): Beijing Intensifies "People’s War" Against “Splittism” as Nationalism 
Rears its Head. China Brief, Vol. 8 Issue 9.  
 <http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4885> Last 
retrieved 3.10.2014. 
249
 The Economist (2009): Is China fraying? 9.7.2009. 
 <http://www.economist.com/node/13988479> Last retrieved 3.10.2014; 
Xinhua (2009): Anti-terror expert: World Uyghur Congress behind Xinjiang violence, 7.7.2009. 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/07/content_11669115.htm> Last retrieved 3.10.2014. 
 64 
 
away from pressing social and economic problems and helped to reinforce popular 
support for the party and its leadership.
250
 Even the handling of Tibetan riots 
worked in favor of the CCP. When some legs of the Olympic torch relay invoked 
anti-China demonstrations and criticism of the country’s poor human rights 
situation, majority of the people at home front sided with the government, firmly 
opposing the right of foreign countries to intervene in China’s internal affairs.251  
Same kind of confrontational rhetoric continued at the fourth plenum of the 17
th
 
NPC in September 2009. All fourth plenary sessions traditionally deal with 
administrative and party-building objectives.
252
 This time, the meeting insisted on 
“drawing a borderline between socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics 
and Western capitalist democracy”.253 Clearly, the two had little in common. To 
ensure the exclusion of unwanted influences, the leadership set the creation a 
“learning-oriented Marxist party” as its new organizational target. Kate Westgarth 
sees this classroom campaign bearing more than just rhetorical value. Socialist 
theory study sessions and the recapitulation of socialist core values can be seen as 
part of a bigger plan to revive the people’s interest in the common ideological 
cause. The measures were also hoped to improve the professional competence of 
unskilled party cadres:  
“Some [cadres] lead a vain and unchallenging life and lack a 
pioneering and creative attitude; some have a weak sense of purpose, 
show strong sings of individualism and bureaucracy; a small number 
abuse power for personal gain and are corrupt. - - Some rely on old 
skills, and don’t care that they don’t have enough ability to cope 
with rapidly developing and increasingly difficult tasks.” 254 
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Emphasis on the party’s governing capacity and public image were of particular 
importance in the wake of the Global Economic Crisis. Holbig recollects how at 
first it seemed as if China had managed to avoid the most severe blow to its 
financial system. However, as the country’s economic growth rate suddenly fell to 
a record low 6.8 per cent in the last quarter of 2008, such illusions quickly lost 
their credibility. By revealing the magnitude of the already present social disparity 
issues and creating a bundle of new ones, the crisis was feared to be “the last 
straw that would break the camel’s back”. The CCP had linked China’s economic 
performance strongly together with its own political legitimacy. Hu and his 
colleagues were truly worried that the hardships might lead to widespread 
upheaval targeted against the incompetent regime.
255
   
The leadership chose not to mimic the anti-capitalist critique of New Leftist 
movements even if such opportunity was now offered on a silver platter. Instead, 
it pointed out loopholes in China’s own economic system and offered Hu’s 
Scientific Outlook on Development as an answer to those problems. Here, official 
argumentation did not rely on socialist or traditional Confucian values but on 
factual deduction that the real reason behind the crisis was an outdated 
dependence on foreign trade. The CCP accepted a 4 trillion yuan ($650 billion) 
stimulus package to reverse the trend and increase state involvement in the 
financial sector. This was the first step towards a new growth model based on 
sustainability and balance between domestic and foreign markets. In a way, the 
financial crisis only hastened this inevitable transition.
256
  
The new CCP motto “qualitatively valuable and relatively quick development”257 
was the trademark of China’s 12th FYP. Fifth plenary session of the 17th Party 
Congress convened in October 2010 to set guidelines for future economic 
policies. The approved blueprint was a sequel to the previous FYP focusing on the 
creation of socialist harmonious society and equality over GDP growth. The target 
rate of annual growth was further lowered to just 7 per cent, thus allowing more 
controlled and composed development.
258
 While this may be the case, it is good to 
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remember that this is also believed to be the critical threshold above which social 
stability can somehow be secured. If the rate falls under it, no guarantees of the 
continuation of CCP legitimacy can be given.
259
 The promotion of domestic 
consumption was therefore a central topic that would not only diminish China’s 
dependency on exports, but also ensure the satisfactory level of GDP growth. Hu 
was keen to leave his mark as the first people-centered leader since the beginning 
of the reform era. This was underlined by renewed attempts to tackle income 
disparity and environmental degradation, but also by the rhetorical trick to change 
the FYP title word order from “Strong State, Wealthy People” into “Wealthy 
People, Strong State”.260  
During his two terms, Hu Jintao gradually reintroduced state investment and 
control as ways to counterbalance the negative side-effects of the reform process. 
This may not resonate well with his predecessors’ economic liberalism, but fits 
the so-called “bird cage” theory that can be seen as the driving motivator behind 
CCP economic policies: a bird trapped inside a small cage represents the Chinese 
economy under strict state supervision. While the cage must not be too small to let 
the bird fly around freely, it should never be totally removed, thus allowing the 
bird to escape into the wild.
261
 The illusion of greater space is enough to keep the 
bird happy and prevent the chaos that would follow from unlimited freedom.
262
 
According to this theory, Hu’s actions were not necessarily statements against 
capitalism as such. He was merely reducing the size of the cage to forestall the 
rise of social instability – an act that first and foremost secures the legitimacy of 
the one-party rule. 
Maintaining the delicate status quo had now become the CCP’s main mission. To 
that end, Hu’s final two years in power were yet again plagued with ideologically 
colored rhetoric. Official discourse used China’s socialist past to create a shared 
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experience of similar values and to oppose harmful influences from abroad. 
However, this only worked up to a certain point. The leadership struggled to find 
a balance between the legitimizing effect of socialist values and overt leftism 
turning against its initial purpose.  
The 6
th
 plenum meeting in October 2011 focused on China’s cultural reform. Hu 
allegedly delivered a keynote speech, which was later published as an essay in 
party magazine. This reveals that the intended target audience actually was much 
larger than just the innermost circle of the CCP leadership. The speech contained 
unusually harsh language: 
“International hostile forces are stepping up efforts to implement 
their strategies of westernizing and dividing China, with ideology 
and culture being key areas of their long-term infiltration.”263 
Hu’s accusations were largely regarded as just another example of CCP’s neo-
Maoist resurgence. Indeed, the text had many similarities with the Great 
Helmsman’s pretentious style. However, the unpublished parts of the speech also 
made notice of the need to fight back in areas of religion and spirituality – both of 
which Mao had strongly rejected as opiate of the masses. According to some 
sources, Hu named Christianity as “the essence of Western culture” and as such 
the party’s main opponent. In order to curb its expansion, CCP needed to “meet 
the growing spiritual and cultural demands of the people” by further promoting 
China’s indigenous traditions. 264 
A driving motive behind the campaign was introducing tighter control on the 
media.
265
 That is why the speech had to be written in a way that justified further 
restrictions on the free flow of information. A government-issued white paper 
explained authorities’ active online presence as a way to protect internet security 
                                                 
263
 Jintao, Hu (2012): Adhering to the Socialist Cultural Development Path with Chinese 
Characteristics and Striving to Build a Country with a Strong Socialist Culture. Qiushi Journal, 
Vol. 4, No. 1. 
<http://english.qstheory.cn/magazine/201201/201203/t20120331_149043.htm> Last retrieved 
7.10.2014. 
264
 Asianews.it (2012): Hu Jintao’s cultural war against the West (and Christianity), 1.2.2012. 
< http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Hu-Jintao%E2%80%99s-cultural-war-against-the-West-(and-
Christianity)-23588.html> Last retrieved 7.10.2014. 
265
 Ibid. 
 68 
 
and pre-empt the distribution of harmful or illegal information.
266
 The party set in 
motion a massive wave of censorship during which thousands of sites were 
blocked and the registration of new ones strictly forbidden for others than 
business users or government authorized organizations.
267
 Just a few months later, 
the government announced regulations on imported television shows, which were 
now banned from airing during prime time hours 7.30 pm to 10 pm. Further 
instructions cut down the share of foreign series to just 25 per cent of the daily 
quota and limited their screening to no more than 50 subsequent episodes. 
Stations were warned of serious repercussions if not willing to comply with the 
new regulations.
268
 It was clear that the party wanted to show the citizens that it 
still held exclusive rights to the truth.  
Hu’s fear of foreign infiltration is easier to understand against the backdrop of 
2011 Arab Spring uprisings. The chain of events that took place in the Middle 
East and Northern Africa led to anonymous calls for a similar “Jasmine 
revolution” in China. Despite activists’ efforts, no massive street protests 
occurred. Although most Chinese remained home and let the police patrol the 
streets alone, party leadership did not leave anything to chance. Xinhua news 
agency quoted Hu encouraging government officials to “solve prominent 
problems which might harm the harmony and stability of the society”.269 An 
editorial in Beijing News made the plea public by declaring how “Everyone 
knows that stability is a blessing and chaos is a calamity”.270 Again, the CCP 
aimed to elevate non-universal values of stability and harmony into facts that no 
rational person could ever come to challenge without being stigmatized as a 
reckless rebel hampering the nation’s modernization.  
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Security forces raised their alert level from high to even higher. According to 
Human Rights Watch World Report 2012, what then followed was the single 
largest crackdown on human rights activist and dissidents since the beginning of 
the 21
st
 century.
271
 All signs of rebellion were suppressed both online and offline. 
The word “jasmine” quickly disappeared from search engines, and even the 
annual China International Jasmine Cultural Festival was cancelled due to the 
flower’s new symbolic meaning.272 To top it all, the NPC announced a 13.8 per 
cent rise in national defense budget with more than 620 billion yuan ($95.0 
billion) allocated to domestic surveillance. For the first time in PRC history, 
internal security spending exceeded the country’s massive military budget.273  
Threat of a revolution from below had not worn off by the CCP 90
th
 anniversary 
celebrations in July 2011. The televised high-profile event was a good opportunity 
for Hu to remind the people of the crucial connection between the nation’s welfare 
and the leadership of the Communist Party: 
“Looking back at China’s development and progress over the past 90 
years, we have naturally come to this basic conclusion: Success in 
China hinges on the Party.”274 
Hu’s anniversary speech was mostly a very conventional one. He made no new 
openings and focused on praising the historic accomplishments of the party. 
However, one feature caught the public’s attention. The speech was full of 
references to social stability, with stability-related words coming up more 
frequently than in any other keynote speech before. According to calculations by 
China Media Project from the University of Hong Kong, Hu had mentioned the 
phrase at least 10 times - twice as often as Jiang in 2001. The message was loud 
and clear. Maintaining stability and status quo under the current system was of 
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mutual interest for both the regime and the Chinese people. The same article  
quoted Hu as saying: 
“Development is the fundamental principle, stability is the 
fundamental task; without stability, nothing can be accomplished, 
and the gains we have already made will also be lost. This principle 
is something not only comrades throughout the Party must bear 
firmly in mind, but that the whole people must be induced to bear 
firmly in mind.” 275 
Rhetoric of national rejuvenation was another repeated element in the anniversary 
speech. As noted earlier, Chinese view of history has been deeply influenced by 
the memory of imperial intrusion and the devastating years of Japanese 
occupation. Tapping into people’s nationalistic sentiment provided the CCP with 
a convenient tool of reinforcing its power position. According to Hu, the party had 
since its formation “heroically shouldered the historic mission of uniting with and 
leading the people in achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”276 
Argumentation built around patriotic values was likely to be well received and 
easily agreed upon.  
Hu had also warned the party cadres of “four dangers”, i.e. the severe internal 
challenges that put the legitimacy of the system increasingly at risk. These 
included “loss of vitality, insufficient capacity, alienation from the people and 
rampant corruption”.277 All of these issues, as well as the general guideline of 
ensuring social harmony, were central to the Confucian ideal of good governance.  
In this sense, Hu seemed to have backed away from the most radical left-leaning 
rhetoric and instead tried to depict himself as the upholder of traditional Chinese 
values.    
In January 2012, the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection released 
a communiqué on anti-corruption. With preparations for the important 18
th
 Party 
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Congress and the upcoming power transfer on the way, the party wanted to 
promote its tireless struggle for better and cleaner government. The retreating 
leadership vowed to achieve tangible results by emphasizing the importance of 
“political discipline” and adherence to party rules. Officials and party members 
were to keep consistent with the major political lines adopted at the highest level 
and not to harbor false illusions of special privileges.
278
 
This document neatly paved the way for the public dismissal of a high-level party 
official, Bo Xilai. The charismatic Chongqing party chief had thus far been one of 
the strongest candidates to enter the Politburo Standing Committee. The events 
leading to his expulsion and eventual arrest have been described as China’s 
biggest political earthquake since the turmoil of Tiananmen.
279
   
Bo’s populist policies ranging from affordable housing initiatives to Red Culture 
campaign against moral decay had gained much attention at both national and 
international level. He had managed to exploit people’s nostalgia for the socialist 
past by reinvigorating selected aspects of Maoist thought.
280
 While Bo cannot be 
accused of starting the leftist revival in Chinese politics, he nonetheless became 
the embodiment of an ideological resurgence critical of intensified reforms and 
globalization.  
As Professor Yuezhi Zhao points out, this critique did not differ much from Hu’s 
people-centric rhetoric.
281
 For the most part they targeted the same frustrated 
groups who either had become losers of the rapid modernization process or 
otherwise longed after the years of social equality and sense of community. 
However, in Chongqing, the phenomenon was taken one step too far, crossing the 
fine line between ideological legitimacy building and trouble causing. Bo’s 
campaigns threatened the carefully preserved status quo by resurrecting mass 
mobilization against existing conditions.
282
 Equally frightening for the central 
leadership was his rapidly growing popularity. Bo’s strategic alliance with the 
working class had gained him many new fans even within the party elite, thus 
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breathing new life into old power struggles between the leftist and rightist 
cliques.
283
 
In March 2012, heated speculations around the aspiring politician’s future were 
finally brought to a halt. The events began to unravel when Chongqing police 
chief unexpectedly sought political asylum from the U.S Embassy. After intense 
interrogations, Bo was dismissed of his duties and expelled from the party due to 
“serious violations of discipline”. His wife’s alleged involvement in the murder of 
a British businessman did little to alleviate suspicions around the former party 
chief. The final blow came in the form of a press conference in which Premier 
Wen Jiabao openly blamed Bo for reviving the ghosts of Cultural Revolution.
284
 
According to an article in the European Council on Foreign Relations 2012 
publication “China 3.0”, Premier Wen had described this period in time as a 
“disaster for the country and the people”. He had also encouraged other officials 
to learn from the mistakes made and to keep in mind that reforms were “crucial 
for China’s future and destiny”.285 Despite the huge media show built around the 
case, Wen’s message was primarily targeted towards other high-ranking party 
officials. It was to act as a public warning against similar deviations from the 
official policy line of the established leadership. 
The point of reference was particularly revealing. This dark period in party history 
is a topic rarely touched upon in public discourse. By linking the two together, the 
CCP condemned the Chongqing model without having to get entangled in 
unpleasant debates about the correctness of the verdict. It also proved the political 
motivators behind Bo’s ousting. Despite the leadership’s supposed leftist turn, the 
future of the reforms was not open for discussion. An important part of the whole 
operation was the subsequent closure of New Leftist websites and communication 
channels. The purpose of this move was to ensure that no similar rebellious 
movements would rise to challenge the established rule.
286
 Once again, the party 
took the culturally embedded value of stability and made it exclusively a CCP 
possession. 
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Hu’s last public appearance as the General-Secretary of the CCP was at the 
opening session of the 18
th
 Party Congress in November 2012. As a retiring party 
leader, his report mainly focused on reviewing the achievements of the past five 
years. He praised socialist core values as “the soul of the Chinese nation” and 
pointed up the primacy of people-centric development.
287
 Yet, the most essential 
part of his legacy was the unquestionable nature of party authority. Associated 
Press Beijing quoted a telling sentence from another farewell speech in July: 
"From start to finish, we must guarantee the party is the indomitable 
leading core of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”288 
Besides summing up the past, the NPC report also gave a glimpse of the new 
leadership’s political agenda. By clinging on to the necessity of reform and 
opening up, Hu implicitly endorsed the speeding up of China’s development 
process. Hu then reiterated his concern over “grave dangers” facing the party and 
its governing capacity.
289
 The most pressing issue of all was the widespread abuse 
of power. If not firmly intervened, corruption might prove deadly for the CCP 
rule: 
 “If we fail to handle this issue well, it could prove fatal to the Party, 
and even cause the collapse of the Party and the fall of the state.”290 
However, top-down controlled administrative measures to strengthen party 
legitimacy did not mean the introduction of democratic values. It was Hu’s 
assertive message that China “will never copy a Western political system”291 – 
instead, as Brown argues in his analysis of Hu’s final speech, the CCP would 
continue to put emphasis on maintaining social stability and introducing gradual 
economic reforms.
292
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The report was a concise summary of CCP’s legitimacy building strategies during 
the reign of Hu Jintao. Socialist ideology and Maoist mass line thinking served as 
generally acceptable premises for argumentation. For Hu, however, the renewed 
stress on ideology did not equal principled opposition to capitalism. Rather, it 
offered concrete and useful tools for creating desperately needed unity amidst the 
anxieties of the third revolution.
293
  
In a similar way, the frequent calls for inner-party reforms and anti-corruption 
initiatives can be explained by CCP’s attempts to secure the future of its heavenly 
mandate. Professors Xing Lu and Herbert W. Simons call to mind the pervasive 
influence of the Confucian value system that put distinctive amount of stress on 
the righteous attributes of the ruler. In modern day China, regime benevolence is 
still measured by its capacity to promote wealth and all-round wellbeing to its 
citizens.
294
 Both of these are directly linked to the government’s performance 
ability and trustworthiness. Without improvements in administration and 
transparency, the party could hardly expect to uphold its authority much longer.
295
 
Hu’s decade at the helm witnessed the introduction of a new kind of political 
rhetoric. He chose to base his arguments on the shared values of people-centric 
rule, social equality, and the culturally embedded ideals of harmony and order 
among the people. These were believed to be easily acceptable grounds for 
tightening the screw on civil society in a situation where globalization and market 
reforms had become subject to loud criticism. Despite the seemingly soft 
approach, the rationale behind it was less emphatic. Hu’s main drive was simply 
to secure the unquestioned rule of the party and its leadership.  
4.2 Strongman Xi Jinping 
Former CCP First Secretary and PRC Vice President, Xi Jinping, was duly 
appointed as Hu’s successor at the 18th Party Congress in November 2012. The 
new General-Secretary has proven to be a somewhat unsolved puzzle when it 
comes to his allegiance to the CCP’s legitimacy building models. Much like Hu 
Jintao, Xi soon developed a peculiar sense of nostalgia towards Maoist China but 
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at the same time was careful not to create an impression of a radical anti-
reformist.
296
  
Hu’s tenure was characterized by his inability to push forward desperately needed 
actions against corruption and other sources of public distrust.  This “lost decade” 
was partly the outcome of CCP’s collective leadership style. Aimed to prevent the 
return of Mao-like personality cults, it had also reduced the relative power of the 
person in charge.
297
 Xi was not convinced of the benefits of such management 
culture. He wanted to bring back the tradition of one supreme leader - a true 
superman - that would bring the perpetrators to their knees.  
4.2.1 18th Party Congress – From dreams to action 
The 18
th
 Party Congress made new some amendments to CCP Constitution in 
order to “step with the times.” The most important of these was the promotion of 
Hu’s Scientific Outlook on Development as the party’s next guiding principle.298 
The act was more symbolic than anything to draw far-reaching conclusions from. 
However, Xi did praise the document’s “fundamental” role in safeguarding the 
morale of the party. He demanded that all members and officials should carefully 
contemplate its content as a way to improve their performance and 
virtuousness.
299
  
Tackling public sector corruption was from early on one of Xi’s major political 
themes. In his remarks to foreign press, the newly appointed General-Secretary 
gave tribute to CCP’s “world-renowned achievements” but in the same breath 
admitted to a certain degree of legitimacy deficiency: 
“Under the new conditions, our Party faces many severe challenges, 
and there are also many pressing problems within the Party that need 
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to be resolved, particularly corruption, being divorced from the 
people, going through formalities and bureaucratism caused by some 
Party officials. We must make every effort to solve these problems. 
The whole Party must stay on full alert.”300 
In China, also non-verbal communication conveys many important messages. 
Some of the hastiest observers might well have declared a departure from Hu’s 
leftist maneuvers when Xi made his first official trip to Shenzhen in December 
2012. This special administrative zone was one of the cradles of China’s 
economic boom in the 1990’s and the starting point of Deng Xiaoping’s famous 
Southern tour in 1992. The legendary journey is often seen as the kick starter of 
China’s modernization process. By choosing to imitate Deng’s trip, Xi signaled 
devotedness to the reform agenda.
301
 In just a couple of months’ time, however, 
he made a similar symbolic trip to Xibaipo, a common place of pilgrimage for 
leftist enthusiasts.
302
 
Xi’s twofold approach immediately raised questions of his political agenda. 
Perhaps the most accurate assessment to date sees his adherence to economic 
reforms and Maoist traditions as two sides of the same coin. Just like Hu, the 
underlining principle remains securing the legitimacy of the communist party. 
This could be obtained through a range of methods aiming to enhance the overall 
performance of the CCP. In addition to controlled GDP growth, socialist morality 
building and efforts to create cleaner government, the toolbox also included a 
revival of strong political leadership. Xi had campaigned for extended General-
Secretary authority long before even entering office.
303
 In a leaked speech from 
January 2013, he argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union could have been 
prevented if only “one real man” had stepped forward to defend the system.304  
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Xi held his thus far most far-reaching speech in March 2013. The occasion 
marked his first public appearance as the President of the PRC and was therefore 
more than suitable for the launching of his own political trademark. The term 
“Chinese Dream” had appeared in some of Xi’s earlier remarks but never received 
similar attention than in this keynote address to the nation. The loose ideological 
construct still lacked vision of practical application, but many interpreted it as a 
call for a stronger state and nation. BBC News China quoted Xi explaining the 
term: 
“We must make persistent efforts, press ahead with indomitable will, 
continue to push forward the great cause of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, and strive to achieve the Chinese dream of great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” 305 
While the concept was new, the idea behind it was everything but. National 
rejuvenation had been a common theme for a number of Chinese leaders trying to 
win over the hearts and minds of the people. Statements such as making China 
“the No. 1 superpower of the world” were Mao’s favorite rallying cries during the 
Great Leap Forward.
306
 Xi’s dream had its counterpart also in the nationalistic 
discourse of reform era China, when the party proclaimed to redeem the country’s 
lost glory and finally put an end to the humiliations of the past century.
307
  
In this respect, Xi relied on proven argumentation methods that were not earth-
shaking, but also unlikely to cause frictions between the different interest groups 
of the society. Zheng Wang reminds how the Chinese understanding of history 
still is largely defined by the memories of colonial oppression and dominance. 
Thus, pleading to the country’s national interests has been an easily accepted 
premise helping to generate strong public support for both revolutions and 
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reforms.
308
 Xi’s formulation included all of these age-old elements but instead of 
past grievances, he based his argumentation on positive values of national strength 
and prosperity.
309
 
The speech did not greatly differ from Hu’s political objectives. Deepening of 
economic reforms remained the leadership’s greatest mission. Xi continued to 
propagate the target of “two 100-years”, which included achieving a “moderately 
well-off society” by 2021 (the 100th anniversary of the CCP) and a “fully 
developed nation” by 2049 (the 100th anniversary of the PRC). In Wang’s analysis 
the concept of Chinese dream fit well together with Hu’s stability-centered 
rhetoric by acting a unifying factor between the people on the left and the right. 
Fulfilling the common dream required a harmonious society where no social 
group or individual would want to contest the status quo. Each citizen was 
required to place common good ahead of his or her personal gains. Better future 
would then naturally follow under the permanence of one-party system.
310
 Similar 
ideal of obedience and knowing one’s place in the bigger picture were central to 
the traditional Confucian state philosophy and therefore expected to gain 
acceptance from the diverse national audience.  
Xi’s neo-Maoist sympathies were momentarily set aside to give room for the 
publication of the new buzzword. However, already in June 2013, the CCP 
initiated a massive nation-wide campaign to revive the socialist spirit of mass line. 
This year-long crusade against “formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism and 
extravagance” was aimed to restore the close connections between the party and 
the people. According to Brendan Forde’s article in the Diplomat magazine, Xi 
had stressed the utmost importance of this new-generation rectification campaign 
by stating that “winning or losing public support is an issue that concerns the 
CCP's survival or extinction.”311 A couple of months later, the New York Times 
reported that in order to succeed in this mission, all party officials were now 
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instructed to participate in self-criticism sessions and “experience the grass-roots” 
by spending more time with the ordinary people.
312
  
Xi’s ambitious attempt to fortify party rule greatly resembled Hu’s 2005 
“Campaign to Maintain the Advanced Nature of Communist Party Members”. As 
Timothy Heath points out, both initiatives were passed on at the beginning of the 
term. Their legitimizing effect was partly derived from the party’s socialist past 
when recurrent study and self-criticism sessions were routine practices to maintain 
people’s trust in party officials. Most importantly, the two campaigns’ main 
purpose was to improve the overall governing capacity of the party. This included 
not only ideological correctness but also pragmatic means to promote 
transparency, improve inner-party democracy and institutionalize party 
procedures - all features of a competent and reliable political actor. 
313
  
As Forde points out, such campaigns were usually introduced to prevent slipping 
from the correct political line, but nowadays they serve a slightly different 
function. What from the outside may seem like courting die-hard Maoism actually 
is more about enforcing institutionalism and better governance. From ideological 
battles, the focus has now moved on to management issues, such as combating 
elite disconnection from the society.
314
 The original mass line also entailed an idea 
of mass mobilization outside the control of authorities, which the current 
leadership fiercely opposes. Actions to encourage public participation at grass 
roots level were followed by demands for more encompassing civic guidance to 
make sure that people’s will would not clash with the perceived interest of the 
party.
315
  
                                                 
312
 Levin, Dan (2013): China Revives Mao-Era Self-Criticism, but This Kind Bruises Few Egos. 
The New York Tmes, 20.12.2013. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/asia/china-revives-mao-era-self-criticism-but-this-
kind-bruises-few-egos.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> Last retrieved 17.10.2014. 
313
 Heath, Timothy (2013): Xi’s Mass Line Campaign: Realigning Party Politics to New Realities. 
China Brief, Vol. 13, Issue 16. 
<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=64&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=
41251&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=b458d366637f6871214f0108ea3cf79f#.VEDHBP
mUe3p> Last retrieved 17.10.2014. 
314
 Forde. 
315
 Tiezzi, Shannon (2013): The Mass Line Campaign in the 21
st
 Century. The Diplomat, 
27.12.2013. 
<http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/the-mass-line-campaign-in-the-21st-century/> Last retrieved 
17.10.2014. 
 80 
 
As part of the campaign, the CCP announced a five-year anti-corruption plan in 
December 2013. All cases of possible corruption were to be closely scrutinized 
and culprits accordingly punished. No distinction would be made between “tigers” 
and “flies”, i.e. high and low-ranking officials.316 The plan sought to underline the 
virtuous nature of the CCP rule and to assure the citizens of its constant efforts to 
better serve the public. At stake here was no other than the legitimacy of the entire 
regime: 
“Corruption is still widespread. The soil that nourishes corruption 
still exists, and the situation remains critical and complicated - - If 
the problems of work styles and corruption are not handled properly, 
they will critically harm the Party, and even lead the Party or nation 
to perish."
317
 
Such hard line rhetoric had been characteristic for Mao and his followers. Some 
saw it as yet another sign of leftist comeback, while others believed it to be just a 
publicity stunt allowing Xi to get rid of his competitors in a morally acceptable 
manner. Indeed, the anti-corruption campaign has mostly targeted officials from 
low to middle ranks, and the few members of party elite that have been caught for 
bribery or tax evasion are known to be Xi’s political rivals.318  
One of them was Zhou Yongkang, a former Politburo Standing Committee 
member and former Minister of Public Security. So far, he has been the highest 
ranking official to face corruption charges. Yet, to ignore his fate as merely part of 
a personal power play would be overly simplifying things. By opposing further 
marketization process and wanting to maintain the key role of the SOEs, as Brown 
argues, Zhou represented a view that was against party consensus. Despite 
appearances, the CCP had at no point given up its commitment to economic 
reforms. Getting rid of Zhou made this point very clear to his fellow leftist 
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comrades.
319
 In addition to broader national audience, these kind of internal power 
blocs were undeniably one of the main target groups Xi had wanted to direct his 
message towards. 
The fall of a high-ranking tiger also raised speculations of the future credibility of 
the party. By attacking Zhou, the CCP put itself in a difficult position. It now had 
to find a way to balance between the legitimizing effects of anti-graft initiatives 
and the challenge similar cases might pose to its already damaged public image. 
As one foreign journalist put it, “To take down a tiger or two is possible, but to 
take down more could rock the stability of the regime, and annihilation of the 
entire corrupt elite would mean self-annihilation”.320 Attacking the highest party 
elite may well turn against its original purpose by showing just how rotten the 
system actually is. It also upsets the delicate power relations at the top.
321
  
To make sure the situation remained under control, Xi set in motion a preventing 
strike against all dissidents and pro-democracy activists. This so-called 
“ideological purification campaign” was another central theme of Xi’s mass line 
efforts. In a speech at the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference in 
August the same year, Xi had proclaimed a “war to win over public opinion”. 
Much of this war was to be waged online, which was why he also wanted to 
gather a “strong internet army”. The official aim was to revive the spirit of Four 
Cardinal Principles
322
. In reality, however, the propaganda apparatus directed its 
focus to ward off unwanted Western influences.
323
  
The assignment had been given in the form of a classified briefing paper, 
“Document No. 9”. According to a New York Times article, the paper declared 
that:  
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“Western forces hostile to China and dissidents within the country 
are still constantly infiltrating the ideological sphere, - - [Opponents 
of the one-party rule] stir up trouble about disclosing officials’ 
assets, using the Internet to fight corruption, media controls and 
other sensitive topics, to provoke discontent with the party and 
government.”324 
The document listed some of the most pressing threats to the stability of the 
Chinese society. These included Western constitutional democracy and universal 
values, such as human rights, neo-liberalism and freedom of the press.
325
 
Ironically, one of the victims of the toughened atmosphere was a civic movement 
calling for greater transparency in governmental agencies.
326
 It was obvious that 
Xi’s inner-party criticism was never meant to slip beyond official control. Public 
expressions of discontent were regarded as serious attempts to undermine the 
legitimacy of the regime.  Not surprisingly then, China was among the bottom-10 
countries of the 2013 World Press Freedom Index with a score better only to Iran, 
Somalia, Syria, Turkmenistan, North Korea and Eritrea.
327
 
Document no. 9 called into question the party’s true stance on China’s reforms. 
The memo was issued by the Central Committee General Office and sent out to 
the different levels of the party organization.
328
 Yet, it is unclear who the targeted 
audience actually was. The paper leaked out only a couple of months ahead of the 
3
rd
 plenum of the 18
th
 Party Congress, which, as all 3
rd
 plenary sessions, focused 
on setting general guidelines for the country’s near-future economic policies. Xi’s 
harsh anti-West rhetoric anticipated an equally unwelcoming attitude towards 
further marketization proposals. Despite, or perhaps because of it, the actual 
outcome of the meeting was, however, something quite the opposite.  
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The plenum adopted a 60-point reform target titled “The Decision on Major Issues 
Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms”. Among the list of concrete 
policy proposals were demands for a more diversified ownership base and 
redefinition of the main functions of China’s huge network of SOEs.329 The 
document also stressed the need of the government and the market to join forces 
in the important task of ensuring healthy economic development. This so-called 
“two hands” –strategy330 aimed to reduce excessive state involvement in fields 
where open competition could produce better results. In place of pervasive central 
planning, the paper proposed setting up a new “service-type government” in 
charge of macro level regulation and control.
331
 Xi’s argumentation leaned heavily 
on the kind of values and premises Hu had determinately shied away from. 
Market was now given a “decisive role”, which was the highest status it had been 
granted since the beginning of the reforms in 1978.
332
  
The state maintained its supervising role in the public sector, but otherwise the 
influence of leftist thinking was reduced to a bare minimum. Measures to enhance 
social governance were not justified by carrying out the socialist ideals of 
egalitarianism and people’s power, but by their ability to “promote harmony and 
vitality of society and to maintain State security”.333 The prevention of social 
disputes was again the number one priority. When combined with traditional 
Confucian values, it acted as an easily justifiable prerequisite for all future 
development.   
Such a radical reform program put a new perspective on Xi’s neo-Maoism. The 
document was practically a song of praise for capitalism and market economy, 
which surely caused a wave of protest among the most ardent left-wing party 
members. Therefore, as an article in the Economist suggests, his earlier rhetoric 
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could in part be explained by an attempt to conciliate the ideological 
conservatives before making this kind of a bold move to the right.
334
  
The theory applies well to both Hu and Xi’s terms in office. During the 21st 
century, the CCP has had to constantly balance between the different interest 
groups of the society. Mao’s political heritage appeals to the part of the public that 
have not benefited from the rapid modernization process. Common ideology and 
morality concepts help to recreate a sense of belonging, but if taken too far, they 
might come to harm the underlying principle of maintaining stability and keeping 
the economy going.  
Another example of Xi’s tightrope walking came right after the publication of the 
reform document, when the CCP issued an instructional paper on promoting 
socialist core values. When visiting university students in Beijing, Xi had 
expressed his concern for the moral cultivation of future policy-makers: “Just like 
buttoning a coat. If the first button is done wrong, all others will be buttoned 
wrong”.335 All aspects of the society, including the media and popular arts, were 
responsible for young people’s proper education. Xi urged artists not to “go astray 
while answering the question of whom to serve” and to “put the social benefits of 
their works before everything else”. The announcement imitated Mao’s famous 
speech about the role of art and literature in a socialist state.
336
 However, closer 
examination reveals that Xi’s twelve core values337 were strongly connected with 
China’s cultural history and had little to do with socialism itself. According to 
Xinhua, one of the core value system’s main objectives was “ensuring smooth 
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operation of social systems and safeguarding social order”.338 In this regard, the 
list resembled Hu’s Eight Honors and Disgraces from six years ago.  
The first real test for the leadership came on December 26
th
 2013, which marked 
the 120
th
 birthday of Mao Zedong. The grand jubilee put Xi in a tight spot. While 
he had been eager to exploit selected aspects of Maoism, such as mass line and 
ideological rectification campaigns, he could not openly embrace the full legacy 
of the disputed Chairman. The case of Bo Xilai had taught that the leftist clique 
could pose a genuine threat to the current regime if given too much room to 
operate. What is more, the third plenum decision to go forward with reforms had 
already distanced the party from its socialist past in a way that not even Deng 
Xiaoping had dared to dream about. However, for Xi, Mao was an important 
source of regime legitimacy and as such above reproach. The Economist reported 
how an article in People’s Daily had found “negation of Lenin and other 
[historical] leaders” to be the main reason behind the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Similar destiny could be escaped by holding high the banner of Marxism-
Leninism-Mao Zedong thought.
339
  
Xi visited Hunan province just a few weeks before the big event. To everyone’s 
surprise, he did not make a stop in the village of Shaoshan – the birthplace of Mao 
and a notorious red tourism destination. Instead, he decided to pay a visit to the 
hometown of Confucius in Southwestern China. The act was undoubtedly full of 
subtle symbolism.
340
 The party was afraid of things getting out of proportion in a 
situation where Mao’s home province alone had spent nearly two billion yuan 
($327 million) in preparations for the festivities. Xi stated that the 
commemorations should be “solemn, simple and pragmatic”. As a result, the party 
changed the title of the main gala from “Reddest is the Sun and Dearest is 
Chairman Mao” to a more generic “Singing for the country - New Year Gala”. 
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Posters advertising the event also underwent a makeover during which the main 
character’s face was replaced with a picture of the Great Hall of the People.341  
Xi’s anniversary speech was truly a significant one. After praising the 
achievements of the late Chairman, he made a heavy argument against the 
creation of personality cults. Like all other great men, Mao was not above 
objective criticism. Time magazine quoted Xi as saying:  
“Revolutionary leaders are not gods, but human beings; [we] cannot 
worship them like gods or refuse to allow people to point out and 
correct their errors just because they are great; - - [we] cannot use 
today’s conditions and level of development and understanding to 
judge our predecessors, nor can we expect the predecessors to have 
done things that only the successors can do.”342 
Xi believed that the most important lessons modern day leaders had to learn from 
the past were “being practical and factual, staying close to the ordinary people and 
staying independent and autonomous”. In an interview in South China Morning 
Post, political scientist Pu Xingzu argued that this signaled an attempt to reconcile 
with rivaling interest groups from both left and right. The party would not lose its 
orientation and implement Western style democracy, nor would it restore the 
obsolete habits of Maoist China.
343
   
For the people, Xi’s version of socialist ideology offered a vision of a just and 
prosperous modern society. For the party, the aim was on safeguarding its own 
power position. Claims of dangerous foreign influences or other threats to social 
harmony handily justified the need to tighten the grip over society. This is exactly 
what the CCP has done all through the 2000’s and increasingly so during the past 
12 months.  
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In January 2014, the party established a new National Security Commission. The 
commission, headed by Xi Jinping himself, was to work directly under the 
supervision of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee.
344
 The agency’s job 
description included everything from traditional military strategies to domestic 
operations defending social stability.
345
 At the first meeting, Xi described national 
security as “a matter of prime importance” and a necessary precondition for future 
development.
346
 In recent history, the party has had to silence a number of 
regional uprisings, the most notable of which took place in Tibet and Xinjiang in 
2008-2009. As a nation with 56 different ethnic groups, similar clashes are likely 
to occur again. The same goes with other mass incidents. The Annual Report on 
China's Rule of Law reviews the country’s legislative development and is 
published by the Social Sciences Academic Press. In its most recent edition 
(2014) it identified a rising trend of civic unrest in the years 2010, 2011 and 
2012.
347
 The results are telling, even if no reliable nation-wide statistics have been 
released.   
The CCP was well aware that huge investments in traditional security operations 
were alone insufficient to control the nation’s climate of opinion. In February 
2014, the party set up an Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group to 
monitor the content of online discussions. The rationale behind it was simple: 
“We should be fully aware of the importance and urgency of Internet 
security and informatization, - - No Internet safety means no national 
security. No informatization means no modernization”.348 
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By linking Internet censorship with the widely shared values of national security 
and modernization, the party could at least try to legitimate its actions to the 
general public.  
The problem had been long acknowledged and caught the attention of the new 
leadership already in the summer of 2013. Back then, Xi had pledged to make 
“online public opinion the top priority of our propaganda work”. The message was 
duly strengthened by a massive crackdown campaign, which led to the 
imprisonment of numerous bloggers and social media activists.
349
 Many blocked 
foreign websites have popular Chinese counterparts that were now put under the 
loop. According to Beijing News – a news outlet known for its more liberal take 
on politics - the state had hired over two million watchdogs to analyze politically 
hazardous post on Sina Weibo microblogs (Chinese equivalent to Twitter) and 
then report their findings back to the central government.
350
  
The launch of the leading group meant stepping up the game. In late 2013, there 
were calculated to be some 618 million Internet users in China
351
  – most of 
whom with constant access online.
 
The announced new restrictions on mobile 
messaging services were aimed to effectively control the spread of unauthorized 
information flow. Mobile device users were from now on required to register by 
using their real names only. Other measures included signing of a contract where 
users with public accounts vowed to “obey the law and uphold the socialist 
system”. In practice, this meant that comments on national politics or other hot 
topics had to be subjected to official approval.
352
 Behind the decision there was an 
old presumption of a silent agreement with the Chinese people: we will give you 
better living conditions, but only in exchange for absolute and indisputable 
authority. This generally accepted premise had been the driving force behind the 
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success of China’s reform period. With the accelerating speed of globalization and 
distrust in political leadership, the idea had become something that party could no 
longer fully rely on. 
Xi’s war against the Internet and social media reflects the party’s general fear of 
losing control. Online messaging services help unite like-minded people and 
create greater awareness of the surrounding society. Social media platforms have 
therefore become an indispensable part of political movements all around the 
world. Especially the advent of camera phones has quickly eroded the monopoly 
on real time news reporting.
353
 The most recent example of this was seen during 
the 2014 Hong Kong Occupy Central demonstrations, when Chinese officials felt 
obliged to shutdown Instagram, a popular photo and video sharing application, to 
prevent pictures of protesting masses spreading into the mainland.
354
  
The Hong Kong pro-democracy protests were the latest challenge to CCP 
credibility. The situation escalated in September 2014 when the Chinese 
government imposed restriction on the procedure of appointing the next city chief 
in 2017.  According to the NPC decision, the selected candidate must be “a person 
who loves the country and loves Hong Kong”. Election methods had to be 
accordingly modified so as to better guarantee the implementation of this core 
principle.
355
 For the people in Hong Kong, this was a violation of universal 
suffrage. Tens of thousands of displeased citizens joined the protest movement 
that quickly occupied the city’s financial center. The protestors demanded direct 
elections and political reforms.
356
 In December the last major protest camps were 
cleared by the Hong Kong authorities, but that is not to say the unrest is truly over 
yet. 
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Xi and the rest of the CCP leadership have refrained from directly commenting on 
the volatile situation. State media on the other hand has taken an active role in 
denouncing the “illegal acts” taking place in Hong Kong.357 According to these 
Chinese news outlets, the protests did not enjoy the support of the majority of the 
local residents and were mainly run by political dissidents.
358
 There have even 
been claims of “external forces” trying to interfere with China’s national 
affairs.
359
 The persistent conflict resembles the Tiananmen demonstrations almost 
exactly 25 years ago.  
Now, more than ever, the CCP leadership needs to win over the general public. In 
October 2014, Xi gave a keynote speech at a national party meeting marking the 
end of the mass line campaign. Shannon Tiezzi notes that while the state owned 
media collectively rejoiced over the many positive effects the past year had 
brought about, Xi himself did not fall into complacency. He warned listeners that 
“lax Party management” still continued to threaten the party’s survival. According 
to Xi, the campaign had only offered a head start in a struggle for cleaner and 
more people-centered governance. He outlined eight further requirements that 
would help in obtaining the goal. These included more effective division of labor 
between the different party branches, compassing ideological education, rooting 
out of unwanted political influences, ensuring the quality of the cadres, getting rid 
of “undesirable work styles”, upholding the principle of equality before the law, 
enforcing supervision from below and keeping to the rules of correct party 
management.
360
 The message was targeted towards both inner and outer audiences 
- incompetent party officials and the displeased citizens grown tired of corruption 
and the lack of proficiency.  
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The theme of enhancing government transparency and capability continued at the 
fourth plenum of the 18
th
 Party Congress in October 2014. This time the focus 
was on juridical reform - “socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics”. The 
demand for greater respect towards the law and constitution can be seen as a 
natural follow-up to Xi’s administrative facelift.361 As the meeting communique 
elaborated: 
“The effectiveness of implementing rule of law will be a significant 
index in judging the work of officials at various levels and will be 
added to their performance appraisal.”362 
While the plenary decision forcefully stressed the need to “build a law-abiding 
government”, it at no point gave an indication of jeopardizing CCP supremacy.363 
According to the text, maintaining party authority was “the most fundamental 
guarantee” to the successful outcome of the process.364  
Both the eight-point listing and the recent call for rule of law offered important 
insight into Xi’s legitimacy building strategies. Their two main features were 
capitalizing on the party’s ideological heritage and the commitment to limited 
administrative reforms. Ideology in this context did not equal a full return to 
Maoist doctrines. Rather, it acted as a valuable source of easily acceptable values 
and moral conceptions, which, together with capable, trustworthy and corruption-
free governance, was hoped to make the party worthy of its extended Mandate of 
Heaven.  
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5 Conclusion 
The examined time period encompasses the reigns of two different CCP leaders. 
Their terms were not identical, but in many ways shared similar objectives and 
rhetorical forms. Behind it all was a widely shared experience of growing 
inequality and rootlessness of which the case of Chongqing as well as the more 
general leftist revival serve as good examples. After decades of high-flying, the 
negative side-effects of China’s record fast modernization process had finally 
become too pressing to ignore.  
The CCP had originally based its authority claims on socialist ideology and the 
party’s revolutionary past. This legitimacy model became obsolete with the launch 
of reform and opening up policies in 1978. Hereon after, ideology was slowly 
replaced by economic pragmatism in which sustained GDP-growth provided the 
party with adequate means to safeguard its ruling position. This performance-
based legitimacy model was in essence a social contract between the Chinese 
society and the party. The people promised to uphold the current political system 
in exchange for concrete improvements in their own level of material comfort. In 
addition to economic growth, the party sought justification to its authority from 
nationalism and the regime’s ability to maintain social order. 365   
In the boom years of early 1990’s, it seemed as if Mao Zedong and his socialist 
theories had begun to lose their appeal. However, just a decade later, the old 
Chairman was again brought out of mothballs to support protestation against all 
the things gone wrong during the reform process. This so-called third revolution 
started out as a marginal academic movement against further marketization, but 
soon expanded into a collective wave of red nostalgia. While the reforms had 
successfully lifted the country from poverty, they at the same time contributed to 
the escalation of income gaps, corruption, unemployment, environmental 
degradation and crumbling of the traditional value system. These conflicted with 
the official rhetoric and called into question the ability of the party to keep its end 
of the deal.  
                                                 
365
 See p. 22-23. 
 93 
 
In order to respond to the rising discontent, both Hu and Xi re-introduced 
elements of Maoism in their speeches and policy lines. This “Quasi-Maoist 
renaissance”366 raised concern of a more fundamental redefinition of China’s 
established course. Hu’s people-centric discourse and Xi’s revival of mass line 
clearly set them apart from previous party leaders. A number of other high-profile 
initiatives ranging from cultural war against the West to combating elite 
corruption only accentuated the difference.  
The change was abrupt and noticeable, but even so, not enough to suggest a full 
departure from the reform era tradition. In fact, a closer look at the rhetoric of the 
past 12 years reveals the constancy of CCP legitimacy strategies. Both Hu and Xi 
have closely followed the theoretical framework of performance-based legitimacy 
by actively pushing forward economic reforms and nationalistic fervor. These 
themes were also commonly used to justify the primacy of maintaining social 
stability – another feature characteristic of reform era pragmatism.  
What the regime did do, then, was merely adapt to the changing conditions. It 
needed to find factors that bound the people together and diminished the risk of 
social unrest that was starting to threaten the future of the one-party rule. In this 
case, the answer was a partial revival of Maoist legacy. The findings of this study 
support Holbig’s updated view of performance, according to which, the promotion 
of socialist standards, including more efficient and transparent governance, can be 
seen as an additional legitimizing feature aiming to reassure the audience of the 
party’s moral capacity to rule. This was crucial in a situation where the system 
had been subjected to mounting criticism from below.  With reference to a 
commonly shared background and values, it also helped to generate a much 
needed sense of unity amidst growing social fragmentation. 
The key here is to tell the difference between a thoroughgoing neo-Maoist 
transformation and a phenomenon that is perhaps best described as “ideological 
cherry picking”. The fourth chapter of this study reveals how the official rhetoric 
gladly borrowed certain aspects of socialist thought but left others completely 
untouched. Leftist ideals were only useful as long as they did not conflict with the 
underlying principle of safeguarding the leadership of the party.
 
That is why the 
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CCP vigorously disassociated itself from all forms of uncontrolled mass 
mobilization that had been essential to Mao’s original state building project.367 
An illusory policy shift offered a way to address societal problems without 
actually making drastic changes to the existing system. Both 21
st
 century party 
leaders were strongly committed to following the path of economic liberalization. 
Renewed attention to socialist ideology gave them more latitude to push forward 
vital reforms while at the same time fixing the legitimacy deficit created by 
discontinuity with official party line. This peculiar “signal left, turn right” –
approach”368 has usually been connected with immediate post-Mao years, but 
seems to have taken root in contemporary Chinese politics as well.
369
  
Another important remark to be made here is the close connection between party 
ideology and Chinese cultural history. As Xing Lu argues, even Mao, a fierce 
anti-traditionalist, had largely based his rhetoric on Confucian notions of idealism 
and ethical behavior. His calls for serving the people did not substantially differ 
from the minben doctrine, which saw serving the people as righteous ruler’s main 
imperative.
370
 In a similar way, Hu and Xi have derived their premises from 
Confucian ideals of harmony, morality and obedience to authority.
371
 This 
cultural/ideological emphasis goes hand in hand with attempts to improve the 
party’s governing capacity. Institutional reforms help generate an image of a 
benevolent and incorruptible leadership that only acts with the public interest in 
mind.  
In the past decade or so, the Chinese society has undergone a drastic restructuring 
process during which a new dominant social group has emerged. Whereas Mao 
addressed his message to the subordinate classes and Deng and Jiang sought to 
make an alliance with the growing business elite, next generation party leaders 
must find common ground with the nation’s huge middle class. Thus far, the 
demographic group - eager to move up the social ladder - has placed stability and 
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predictability over any dramatic system changes.
372
 But, as Charter 08 so clearly 
showed, not all of them are willing to keep silent just in the name of preserving 
harmony.
373
 In return for loyalty, they are promised tangible improvements in 
party management and public service. Timothy Heath’s analysis of the recent 
mass line campaign draws together both Xi and Hu’s tenures and sees them as 
part of a longer-term endeavor to realign with the toughened expectations for 
party governance and leadership.
374
 In this regard, the CCP’s ideological and 
administrative purification campaigns can also be seen as an attempt to broaden 
the concept of “performance” to better match the demands of today’s society.  
The road ahead is not easy. According to some scholars, political systems relying 
on performance are in a continual state of crisis and restlessness.
375
 In the near 
future, we are likely to witness much more thorough-going administrative reforms 
and new social policy openings. With the CCP 100
th
 anniversary in 2021 drawing 
closer, the party will do everything in its capacity to maintain its position. 
Economic growth will inevitably slow down at one point or another, which means 
that more weight will have to be put on social issues, grass roots political 
participation and other features of good governance that could still help tilt the 
odds in favor of the current regime.
376
 That being said, it seems highly unlikely 
that such efforts will result in real democratization process or other substantial 
changes in the party’s legitimacy building strategies.  
Ultimately, the CCP’s Mandate of Heaven depends on nothing but the party itself. 
It must convince the people of its moral and political superiority despite the 
growing pressures of the third revolution. If unable to do so, it may just as well 
bid farewell to power. As an old Chinese saying goes, “Gain the hearts of the 
people and win the world; lose the hearts of the people and lose the world”. 377 
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